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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S.-Mexico trade relations are changing at a rapid pace. In 1985,
the United States and Mexico entered into a bilateral trade agreement
that seeks to eliminate the subsidization of manufactured products.' One
year later, Mexico became a signatory to the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (the "GATT"),2 the multilateral accord that governs
world trade in manufactured and agricultural products. In 1987, the two
countries entered into a framework agreement that establishes a consult-
ative mechanism designed to resolve bilateral trade disputes involving
such issues as intellectual property protection, direct foreign investment,
and trade in goods and services
In May of 1990, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari received legisla-
tive authority from the Mexican Congress to negotiate a free trade agree-
ment with the United States.4 In June of that year, President Salinas and
President Bush issued a joint statement to undertake bilateral consulta-
tions to discuss the feasibility of entering into such an agreement.5 Be-
cause the United States is Mexico's largest trading partner,6 and because
Mexico is the third largest trading partner of the United States,7 a bilat-
eral free trade agreement has the potential to generate handsome trade
gains for both countries.
As a result of this trade potential, both Mexico and the United
States are poised to enter into free trade negotiations. By a letter dated
August 21, 1990, President Salinas formally proposed the initiation of
1 Understanding Between the United States and Mexico Regarding Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties (April 23, 1985) United States-Mexico; see also Determination Regarding The Application of
Certain International Agreements, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,335, 18,336 (1985).
2 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter "GATT"]. The United States became a signatory to
the GATT in 1947. 61 Stat. A 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 182. Mexico became a signatory to
the GATT on August 24, 1986. Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 335, 340
(Ct.Int'l Trade 1988). Today, the GATT comprises 100 signatory countries. GATT, GATT Infor-
mation and Media Relations Division (1990). For a further discussion of the GATT, see Giesse &
Lewin, The Multifiber Arrangement: "Temporary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 Law and Pol'y. Int'l.
Bus. n.1 (1987) (" 'Temporary' Protection Run Amuck").
3 Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Mexican States Concerning A Framework of Principles and Procedures For Consulta-
tions Regarding Trade And Investment Relations, (Nov. 6, 1987), United States-Mexico, 27 I.L.M.
439 (1988). For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S.-Mexico framework agreement, see Smith,
The United States-Mexico Framework Agreement: Implications for Bilateral Trade, Vol. 20 No. 4,
LAW AND POL'Y. INT'L. Bus., 655-681 (1989).
4 N.Y. Times, June 3, 1990, at sec. 3, p.1, col. 5.
5 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1,355 (Sept. 12, 1990).
6 Office of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, OBR 90-09, Marketing
in Mexico, 3 (August 1990).
7 Id.
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such negotiations to President Bush.' By official correspondence dated
September 25, 1990, President Bush notified the U.S. Senate Committee
on Finance and the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means of the
Administration's intention to enter into free trade negotiations with
Mexico. 9 The Bush Administration projects that the free trade talks will
begin sometime during the spring of 1991.
Although these high profile developments have dominated U.S.-
Mexico trade relations recently, other less prominent, but nonetheless
critical, trade issues also continue to have a significant impact upon U.S.-
Mexico bilateral trade. In particular, many Mexican exporters doing
business in the United States have found themselves involved in a grow-
ing number of U.S. antidumping actions. Mexican exporters of steel wire
rope, porcelain-on-steel cooking ware, steel pails, fresh cut flowers, and
gray portland cement have been subject to complex U.S. antidumping
proceedings during the past year.10
Furthermore, Mexican exporters, until recently, were involved in a
relatively large number of U.S. countervailing duty actions. Although
the number of these actions has decreased during the past few years,
many Mexican exporters still are subject to outstanding U.S. counter-
vailing duty orders. The existence of these orders creates uncertainty for
Mexican exporters unfamiliar with U.S. countervailing duty procedures
and plays a key role in the business decisions made by these individuals.
As U.S. and Mexican negotiators attempt to unite two radically dis-
8 136 Cong. Rec. S14,378 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990).
9 Id.
10 To date, the United States has initiated fifteen antidumping duty investigations covering Mex-
ican imports. See e.g., Bulk, Crude, Undried Solar Salt From Mexico, Determination of Sales at Not
Less Than Fair Value, 31 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (Aug. 16, 1966); Elemental Sulphur From Mexico, 37
Fed. Reg. 12,727 (1972); Picker Sticks From Mexico, Antidumping, 39 Fed. Reg. 20,370 (1974);
Portland Hydraulic Cement, Other Than White Non-Staining Cement From Mexico, Antidumping,
40 Fed. Reg. 54,207 (1975); Multi-Metal Lithographic Plates From Mexico, Antidumping, 41 Fed.
Reg. 17,581 (April 27, 1976); Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables From Mexico; Antidumping: Final
Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,512 (1980); Carbon Steel Wire
Rod From Mexico, Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,579 (1983); Oil
Country Tubular Goods From Mexico: Initiation of Antidumping Investigation, 49 Fed. Reg. 28,086
(1984); Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation; Welded Steel Wire Fabric For Concrete Rein-
forcement From Mexico, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,443 (1985); Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
Value: Porcelain-On-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,435 (1986); Portland Hy-
draulic Cement (Including Cement Clinker) From Mexico; Initiation ofAntidumping Duty Investiga-
tion, 51 Fed. Reg. 42,607 (1986); Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value Certain;
Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico, 52 Fed. Reg. 6,361 (1987); Certain Steel Pails From Mexico; Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,245 (1990); Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Gray Portland Cement and Clinker From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg.
29,244 (1990); Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation; Certain Steel Wire Rope From Mexico,
55 Fed. Reg. 50,732 (1990).
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similar economies during the forthcoming free trade talks, there may ex-
ist the tendency to neglect the less prominent issues. The free trade
negotiators must be especially alert in the area of dumping and subsidies.
Just as similar issues - agricultural export subsidies, in particular -
may determine the ultimate fate of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
GATT negotiations, so certain dumping and subsidy issues may deter-
mine the ultimate success or failure of prospective U.S.-Mexico free trade
talks.
For these reasons, this Article discusses the current administration
of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws in proceedings in-
volving products from Mexico. Specifically, this Article begins by pro-
viding an overview of the basic statutory and regulatory provisions of the
U.S. antidumping duty law, emphasizing the application of certain provi-
sions in cases involving imports from Mexico. The Article then focuses
its discussion upon recent developments in the U.S. countervailing duty
law that have had a unique effect upon Mexican exporters. The Article
continues by highlighting the antidumping and countervailing duty pro-
visions of the recently concluded U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
(the "FTA" or "Agreement"). Finally, this Article concludes by offering
U.S. and Mexico free trade negotiators a few suggestions to ensure the
successful completion of the forthcoming free trade talks.
II. BASIC STRUCTURE OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING ACTIONS
A. Introduction
This section of the Article explains the concept of dumping and pro-
vides an overview of the U.S. antidumping law.11 Specifically, this sec-
tion discusses the basic statutory and regulatory provisions of the U.S.
antidumping law, describes the regulatory procedures that govern the ad-
ministration of U.S. antidumping proceedings,12 and highlights certain
practical considerations unique to these proceedings.
Dumping generally refers to a form of international price discrimi-
nation whereby a foreign exporter charges a higher price for goods or
services sold in its home market than it charges for comparable goods or
11 This Article discusses those statutory and regulatory procedures and requirements that gov-
ern the majority of U.S. antidumping duty proceedings. Those procedures and requirements that are
applicable in exceptional cases (eg., material retardation of an infant U.S. industry) are beyond the
scope of this Article.
12 A U.S. antidumping proceeding usually consists of two phases: (1) the initial investigation;
and (2) the subsequent administrative review. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(),(q) (1989); Cementos Ana-
huac Del Golfo, S.A. v. United States, 689 F.Supp. 1191, 1210-1211 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); aff'd,
Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 879 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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services sold in an export market.13 The classical theory of dumping pro-
vides that price discrimination practices usually occur when tariff and
nontariff trade barriers in the foreign exporter's home market create a
protective barrier that enables an exporter with market power in that
market to earn excessive or monopolistic profits in the home market.14
Because the exporter reaps the benefits of such profits, it is able to charge
a relatively lower price for comparable goods or services sold in an ex-
port market, such as the U.S. market.15 The foreign exporter essentially
leverages the lower priced export sales with higher priced home-market
sales. Article VI of the GATT 6 and the GATT Antidumping Code17
authorize signatory countries to impose antidumping duties, in addition
to customs duties, upon dumped manufactured and agricultural products
that cause or threaten material injury to, or materially retard the estab-
lishment of, a domestic industry." Neither the GATT nor the GATT
Antidumping Code currently authorizes signatory countries to impose
antidumping duties upon services.1 9 Title VII, section 731, of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended2' (the "Tariff Act"), is the U.S. domestic an-
13 J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3-9 (1923).
14 Botluck, An Economic Analysis of Dumping, 21 J. World Trade L. 45, 47 (1987). The classical
theory of dumping provides that a rational firm will dump its merchandise into an export market in
the long run only if the following three conditions exist: (1) separate national markets, along with
protective trade barriers, prevent the importation and reimportation of lower priced imports into the
exporter's home market; (2) the foreign exporter has market power in its home market; and (3) the
exporter faces a more elastic demand curve in an export market, such as the U.S. market, than it
faces in its home market. Id. If all three of these conditions do not exist, then a rational firm in the
long run will charge the same price in an export market and in the home market. Id. Even if all
three of these conditions do not exist, however, a rational firm still may decide to engage in dumping
practices in the short run. For example, a new entrant may decide to dump its merchandise in an
export market to build goodwill in order to increase its share of that market. Knoll, Michael, An
Economic Approach To The Determination Of Injury Under United States Antidumping And Coun-
tervailing Duty Law, 22 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PoLrrIcs, 39, 43 (1989) [hereinafter "An Eco-
nomic Approach"].
15 Id.
16 GATT, supra note 2, art. VI.
17 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT, MTN/NTM/W/232, reprinted in
House Doc. No. 96-153, pt. I at 311 [hereinafter "GATT Antidumping Code"]. The United States
became a signatory to the GATT Antidumping Code in 1979. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. 96-39, Title I, § 101, 93 Stat. 154; Committee on Ways And Means, U.S. House of Representa-
tives: Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes, 56 WMCP: 101-14, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) [hereinafter "Overview of U.S. Trade Statutes"]. Mexico became a signatory to the GATT
Antidumping Code in 1982.
18 See supra notes 16 and 17.
19 See id. Whether the ambit of the GATT should be expanded to cover trade in services is
currently one of the issues subject to negotiation in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions. Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1990, at HI, H6.
20 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677k (1990). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 repealed and super-
seded the Antidumping Act of 1921, which governed the administration of U.S. antidumping actions
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tidumping law that implements U.S. international obligations arising
under the GATT and the GATT Antidumping Code.2
B. Basic Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Governing U.S.
Antidumping Duty Actions
Section 731 of the Tariff Act authorizes the United States to impose
antidumping duties upon manufactured and agricultural products when
two conditions exist. First, the U.S. Department of Commerce ("Com-
merce"), through the International Trade Administration (the "ITA"),
must determine "that a class or kind22 of foreign merchandise is being, or
is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value."
2 3
Selling at less than fair value generally refers to the practice of
charging a higher price for merchandise sold in the foreign exporter's
home market or a market other than the U.S. market (i.e., third-country
market) than the price charged for comparable merchandise sold in the
U.S. market.24 Commerce generally determines whether a foreign ex-
porter is selling merchandise at less than fair value by comparing the
price of the merchandise sold in the U.S. market, adjusted for differences
in production costs or selling expenses (i.e., the U.S. price), with the ad-
justed price of identical or similar merchandise sold in the exporter's
home market or a third-country market (Le., foreign market value).2"
from 1921 until 1979. 42 Stat. 11, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (repealed); Overview of U.S. Trade Statutes,
supra note 17, at 55-56. The 1979 Trade Act also added new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930 to
govern U.S. antidumping duty actions. Id. Soon after enacting the 1979 trade legislation, Congress
transferred the administrative authority to make antidumping determinations from the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979,
§ 5(a)(1)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,275, eft. Jan 2, 1980, reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1988); 93 Stat.
1381 (1979).
21 See supra notes 16 and 17.
22 The phrase "class or kind of foreign merchandise" refers to the merchandise described in the
petition that the foreign manufacturer exports to, and the U.S. importer imports into, the United
States. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(m) (1989).
23 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1990).
24 See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1673 et seq. (1990).
25 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(f)(1) (1989). Contrary to a common misperception, only less-than-fair-
value sales - not below-cost sales in the U.S. market - are actionable pursuant to Title VII of the
Tariff Act. Compare supra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text (only less-than-fair-value sales
are actionable pursuant to the U.S. antidumping law) with e.g., Knoll, An Economic Approach, supra
note 14 at 44 ("Title VII covers two kinds of dumping, cost dumping and price dumping")(emphasis
added); Lindsey, Brink, Anti-Dumping's Dirty Secrets . . ., The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 15,
1990)("Dumping is commonly characterized as an international form of predatory pricing"). If a
foreign exporter is selling its merchandise in the U.S. market below its costs of production, then such
predatory pricing behavior is subject to a U.S. antitrust statute, the Antidumping Act of 1916. 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1988). This antitrust statute provides for criminal and civil penalties where a foreign
exporter is selling at prices below actual market value in the U.S. market. Id. To obtain legal relief
pursuant to this statute, the U.S. domestic manufacturer must prove that the foreign exporter in-
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The second condition necessary for the imposition of antidumping
duties is that the U.S. International Trade Commission (the "ITC" or
"Commission"), an independent federal agency, must determine that "an
industry in the United States is materially injured, or is threatened with
material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States
is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise."26 The
ITC makes this determination by analyzing a variety of economic factors
discussed in a subsequent section of this Article.
If Commerce determines that a foreign exporter or manufacturer is
selling its merchandise at less than fair value in the U.S. market, and if
the ITC determines that such sales are a cause of, or threaten to cause,
material injury to the relevant U.S. domestic industry, Commerce then
will publish in the Federal Register27 an antidumping duty order2" cover-
ing the unfairly traded merchandise (the "subject merchandise").29 Pur-
tended to destroy or injure the relevant U.S. domestic industry by charging a predatory price in the
U.S. market. Id. To date, no U.S. plaintiff has mounted a successful case pursuant to the An-
tidumping Act of 1916. The principal reason for this result is that it is extremely difficult to prove.
intent. Id.
26 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1990).
27 See 44 U.S.C §§ 1501-1511 (1988). The FederalRegister is the official publication of the U.S.
Government in which the United States announces certain legal determinations. The equivalent
publication in Mexico is El Diario Oficial.
28 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1989). When more than one antidumping
duty order is in effect covering the same class or kind of merchandise, section 732 of the Tariff Act
authorizes Commerce, when certain other statutory conditions also exist, to monitor imports of that
class or kind of merchandise from an additional supplier country or countries. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a(a)(2)(A) (1990). If, after monitoring such imports for a period not to exceed one year,
Commerce concludes that there is "an extraordinary pattern of persistent injurious dumping from
one or more additional supplier countries" and that "this extraordinary pattern is causing a serious
commercial problem for the domestic industry," then Commerce will initiate a formal antidumping
duty investigation concerning the imports from the additional supplier country or countries. Id.
Commerce recently completed a monitoring program covering televisions from Mexico and Malay-
sia.
Furthermore, section 780 of the Tariff Act authorizes Commerce, upon the receipt of a petition
filed by a U.S. domestic producer, to monitor an imported product (Le., "downstream product")
which incorporates a component part subject to an outstanding antidumping or countervailing duty
order. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677i (1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 9,047 (1990) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.27)
(interim final rule). The order must impose a duty rate of at least 15 percent on the component part.
Id. The component part must be "routinely used as a major part, component, assembly, subassem-
bly, or material in [the] downstream product." 19 U.S.C. § 1677i(d) (1990); see also 55 Fed. Reg.
9,048 (1990) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.27(f)(2)(ii)) (interim final rule). If Commerce deter-
mines that there is a "reasonable likelihood that imports into the United States of the downstream
product will increase as an indirect result of any diversion with respect to the component part," (19
U.S.C. § 1677i(a)(2)(A) (1990)) and if the ITC determines that imports of the downstream product
have increased by a specified percentage, then Commerce may initiate a formal antidumping duty
investigation concerning the imported downstream product (19 U.S.C. § 1677iQ,)(1) (1990); 55 Fed.
Reg. 9,048 (1990) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.27(e)) (interim final rule)).
29 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1990). The U.S. antidumping law also authorizes Commerce to include
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suant to the antidumping duty order, Commerce will direct the U.S.
Customs Service ("Customs") to impose antidumping duties equal to the
amount by which the foreign market value of the subject merchanaise
exceeds its U.S. price (the "dumping margin").30 The U.S. antidumping
law requires the U.S. importer, not the foreign manufacturer or exporter,
to pay these antidumping duties to Customs. 31
C. Basis of Comparison: Foreign Market Value and U.S Price
L Calculation of Foreign Market Value
Foreign market value, a term of art, is the price at which a foreign
exporter sells, or offers to sell, the subject merchandise in markets
outside the United States.32 Commerce selects, in order of preference,
one of three methods3 3 to calculate foreign market value: (1) home-mar-
ket sales;34 (2) third-country sales; 35 or (3) constructed value.3 6
Regardless of which method Commerce ultimately selects to calcu-
late foreign market value, Commerce generally calculates a weighted-av-
erage foreign market value for the entire period under investigation.37
The investigative period usually covers six months.38 The exception to
this general rule applies when the home-market economy is experiencing
hyperinflation.39 In such a situation, Commerce usually calculates a
other articles of commerce, in addition to the subject merchandise, within the scope of the antidump-
ing duty order to prevent or address attempts by foreign exporters to circumvent the order. See 19
U.S.C. § 1677j (1990). Specifically, section 781 of the Tariff Act authorizes Commerce to include
within the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty order the following additional articles of
commerce when certain other statutory conditions exist: (1) parts and components in cases involv-
ing U.S. assembly operations; (2) third-country merchandise in cases involving third-country assem-
bly operations; (3) merchandise altered in minor respects before importation into the United States;
and (4) later-developed merchandise. See id.
30 19 U.S.C. § 1673e (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(f)(1) (1989).
31 Id.; 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.21; 353.26 (1989).
32 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1990).
33 Id.; 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.46 et seq. (1989). When a multinational corporation manufactures the
subject merchandise in more than one foreign country, a special rule to calculate foreign market
value may be applicable. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.53 (1989).
34 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (1990).
35 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1990).
36 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2), (e) (1990).
37 See Gray Portland Cement and Clinker From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 29,244 (final determina-
tion). Section 777A of the Tariff Act also authorizes Commerce to "use averaging or generally
recognized sampling techniques" to calculate foreign market value, as well as U.S. price, "whenever
a significant volume of sales is involved or a significant number of adjustments to prices is required
.. " 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.59 (1989).
38 This period includes the month in which the petitioner files the petition and the five preceding
months. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(b) (1989).
39 Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Mex-
ico, 52 Fed. Reg. 6,361 (1987). Hyperinflation exists when the monthly inflation rate in the home-
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monthly weighted-average foreign market value.4 In the antidumping
duty investigation of Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico, for exam-
ple, Commerce calculated a monthly weighted-average foreign market
value, because the Mexican home-market economy was experiencing
hyperinflation during the relevant period.4"
If a foreign exporter sells sufficient quantities of the subject mer-
chandise in its home market, then Commerce uses home-market sales to
calculate foreign market value.42 Commerce considers the quantity of
home-market sales to be sufficient when such sales constitute five percent
or more by volume of identical or similar merchandise sold in third-
country markets.4 3
If, however, home-market sales do not exist, or if such sales are less
than five percent of third-country sales, then Commerce uses either third-
country sales of identical or similar merchandise or the constructed value
of the imported merchandise to calculate foreign market value. 4 The
Commerce regulations establish a preference for third-country sales,
rather than constructed value, to calculate foreign market value."5
If third-country sales do not exist, or if Commerce determines that
the volume of such sales is so small as to form an inadequate basis for
comparison with U.S. sales, then Commerce uses constructed value to
calculate foreign market value.46 The constructed value of the subject
merchandise, as imported into the United States, consists of the follow-
ing cost components: (1) the cost of materials and fabrication (e.g., labor
and factory overhead);4 7 (2) general expenses (e.g., selling, general, and
market economy is five percent or higher for a sustained period. See Administrative Review of An-
tidumping Order; Certain Iron Construction Castings from Brazil, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,238, 26,240
(1990).
40 52 Fed. Reg. at 6,361. When hyperinflation exists, Commerce may make other adjustments to
price, id., in addition to calculating a monthly weighted-average foreign market value during the
investigative stage of the antidumping proceeding. Final Determination of Sales At Not Less Than
Fair Value; Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Peru, 52 Fed. Reg. 7,000, 7002 (1987). Commerce also
uses under such circumstances replacement costs incurred during the month of sale, rather than
historical costs, to calculate constructed value or the cost of production. See Amended Final Deter-
mination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Amended Antidumping Duty Order; Tubeless Steel
Disc Wheels from Brazil, 53 Fed. Reg. 34,566 (1988); see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
41 52 Fed. Reg. at 6,363 (final determination).
42 19 C.F.R. § 353.46 (1989).
43 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.48(a) (1989).
44 Id.
45 19 C.F.R. § 353.48(b) (1989).
46 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2),(e) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50 (1989).
47 Factory overhead consists of indirect materials, indirect supplies, depreciation, utilities, re-
pairs, maintenance, heat, light, power, plant and equipment, and the like. See Brock and Palmer,
CosT ACCOUNTING: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 1, 5-6, (4th Ed. 1984).
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administrative expenses),4" which cannot be less than 10 percent of mate-
rial and fabrication costs;49 and (3) profit, which cannot be less than 8
percent of the sum of the material/fabrication costs plus general ex-
penses. 50 Constructed value also includes packing costs incurred to ex-
port the product to the United States.51
As discussed above, Commerce typically uses constructed value to
calculate foreign market value when both home-market sales and third-
country sales do not exist, or when the volume of such sales is so small as
to form an inadequate basis for comparison with U.S. sales. Commerce
also uses constructed value when the agency finds substantial sales made
below the cost of production in either the home-market or the third-
country market, and the remaining above-cost sales by themselves consti-
tute an insufficient basis upon which to calculate foreign market value.52
Similar to constructed value, the cost of production of the merchandise
48 General expenses (eg., selling, general, and administrative expenses) consist of the following
items: (1) direct selling expenses (eg., credit, warranty, and advertising expenses); (2) indirect sell-
ing expenses (e.g., telephone, rapidfax, stationary, postal charges, and salesmen's salaries); and (3)
general and administrative expenses (eg., salaries ofnonsales personnel, rent, heat, and light). Cour-
sey and Binder, Hypothetical Calculations Under The United States Antidumping Duty Law: Foreign
Market Value, United States Price, and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L &
POL'Y, 537, 545-546 (1989) [hereinafter "Hypothetical Calculations"].
49 The U.S. antidumping duty law provides that when Commerce uses constructed value to
calculate foreign market value, the amount allocated for "general expenses shall not be less than 10
percent" of the cost of manufacturing the product under investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(i)
(1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a)(2) (1989).
50 The U.S. antidumping duty law provides that when Commerce uses constructed value to
calculate foreign market value, the amount allocated for "profit shall not be less than 8 percent of the
sum of... [the] general expenses and cost [of manufacturing]" the product under investigation. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(ii) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a)(2) (1989).
51 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(C) (1988). Commerce also adjusts the constructed value of the im-
ported merchandise, when appropriate, for direct and indirect selling expenses. Hypothetical Calcu-
lations, at 546-548.
52 See Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Ad-
ministrative Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061 (1990). Section 773(b) of the Tariff Act authorizes Com-
merce to institute a cost-of-production investigation only if, as a result of an allegation made by the
petitioner, the agency has "reasonable grounds to believe or suspect" that a specific foreign company
is selling a specific product in the home market or third-country market below its cost of production.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.51 (1989); Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United
States, 575 F. Supp. 1277 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (specific and objective evidence needed to trigger
cost-of-production investigation). If, after conducting a cost-of-production investigation, Commerce
determines that fewer than 10 percent of home-market or third-country sales are below the cost of
production (50 percent in the case of highly perishable agricultural products), then Commerce will
not disregard any of the below-cost sales for purposes of calculating foreign market value. Timken
Co. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 495, 513 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). If Commerce determines that
more than 10 percent, but fewer than 90 percent, of the home-market or third-country sales are
below the cost of production, then Commerce will disregard all such sales and will use the remaining
above-cost sales for purposes of calculating foreign market value. Id. If the below-cost sales exceed
90 percent of the total home-market or third-country sales, then Commerce usually will use con-
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sold in the home market or third-country market includes material/
fabrication costs and general expenses (e.g., selling, general, and adminis-
trative expenses). 53 In contrast to constructed value, the cost of produc-
tion of the subject merchandise does not include profit.54
2. Calculation of US. Price
Commerce uses one of two methods on a sale-by-sale basis to calcu-
late the price of the subject merchandise sold in the United States: (1)
purchase price; or (2) exporter's sales price.55 The term "purchase price"
refers to the U.S. sales price at which the imported merchandise "is
purchased, or agreed to be purchased, prior to the date of importation"
from the foreign exporter.56 Commerce selects purchase price to calcu-
late U.S. price when the date of the U.S. sale to the first unrelated U.S.
customer occurs before the entry of the merchandise into the customs
territory of the United States.5 7
The term "exporter's sales price" refers to the U.S. sales price at
which the imported merchandise "is sold or agreed to be sold in the
United States, before or after the time of importation, by or for the ac-
count of the exporter."5" Commerce uses the exporter's sales price to
structed value to calculate foreign market value. Id. This so-called "ten-ninety percent" test is
currently subject to a judicial challenge. Id.
53 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(c) (1989). A foreign exporter's cost of production consists of the cost of
materials and fabrication (eg., labor and factory overhead) incurred by the subject merchandise sold
in the home market or third-country market. Id. The cost of production also includes general
expenses (eg., general, selling, and administrative expenses), in addition to packing costs, incurred
by that merchandise. Id. In contrast to the constructed value, the cost of production of the subject
merchandise does not include profit. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(ii) (1990) with 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.51(c) (1990). Also, the cost of production includes the cost of packing the subject merchandise
for delivery to the home market or third-country market, rather than to the U.S. market. 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.51(c) (1989). Finally, the cost of production includes general expenses that are based upon the
foreign exporter's actual experience, rather than upon a minimum statutory requirement. Compare
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(i) (1990) with 19 C.F.R. § 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(c) (1989).
54 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(c) (1989); supra note 53.
55 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1990). Commerce generally uses the adjusted price of each U.S. sale to
calculate the U.S. price of the product under investigation. 55 Fed. Reg. at 21,061 (final results of
first antidumping duty administrative review). The exception to the general rule applies when the
product or commodity under investigation is perishable, and the value of the product or commodity
changes rapidly. Commerce calculates a weighted-average U.S. price under such circumstances. See
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
55 Fed. Reg 12,696 (1990).
56 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(b) (1989).
57 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(b) (1989); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware
From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061 (1990) (final results of first antidumping duty administrative
review). A lease of merchandise can constitute a sale pursuant to section 771(19) of the Tariff Act
under certain circumstances. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(19) (1990).
58 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(c) (1989).
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calculate U.S. price when the date of the U.S. sale to the first unrelated
U.S. customer occurs after the entry of the subject merchandise into the
United States.59
An exporter's sales price situation typically arises when a foreign
exporter ships the subject merchandise to its subsidiary or related-party
selling agent located in the United States.6' The U.S. subsidiary, in turn,
first warehouses and then sells the merchandise to an unrelated U.S. cus-
tomer. Because the price (i e., transfer price) charged by the foreign ex-
porter to its related-party U.S. subsidiary usually is not an arm's length
price - that is, a price set in accordance with free market conditions -
Commerce does not use transfer prices to calculate the U.S. price of the
subject merchandise. 6' Instead, Commerce uses the arm's length price at
which the related-party U.S. subsidiary sells the subject merchandise to
the first unrelated U.S. customer to calculate U.S. price and dumping
margins.62
3. Adjustments Made to Foreign Market Value and to U.S. Price
Because the home-market or the third-country merchandise usually
incurs production costs and selling expenses different from those of the
foreign merchandise imported into the United States, Commerce does
not use final selling prices or end-user prices to compare foreign market
value with U.S. price. These different costs and expenses necessarily
would render such a price comparison asymmetrical and, as a conse-
quence, would distort dumping margins.
Instead, the U.S. antidumping law requires Commerce to make a
symmetrical comparison between the merchandise sold in the foreign
market and that sold in the U.S. market. To achieve such a comparison,
Commerce compares prices at a common point in the distribution sys-
59 Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061 (1990) (first antidumping
duty administrative review).
60 Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061 (1990) (first antidumping
duty administrative review). Section 771(13) of the Tariff Act considers the following U.S. entities to
be related to a foreign exporter for purposes of calculating U.S. price: (1) a U.S. agent or principal of
the foreign exporter; (2) a U.S. company that "owns or controls, directly or indirectly, through stock
ownership or control or otherwise, any interest [Ie., five percent as interpreted by Commerce] in the
business of the [foreign] exporter"; (3) a U.S. company controlled by the foreign exporter through
stock ownership of at least five percent (see Titanium Sponge From Japan: Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 49 Fed. Reg. 38,687, 38,691 (1984)); and (4) a U.S. company con-
trolled by a foreign parent company that "own[s] or control[s] in the aggregate 20 percent or more of
the voting power or control in the business carried on by" both the U.S. company and the foreign
exporter. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(13) (1990).
61 See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(c),(e) (1989); Porcelain-on-Steel
Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061 (1990).
62 See id.
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tern. This common point occurs when the merchandise destined for sale
in the home market, third-country market, or U.S. market is at the fac-
tory gate (Le., ex-factory prices).6"
To make this ex-factory price comparison, Commerce must make a
variety of adjustments to foreign market value and to U.S. price. This
adjustment process is probably the most critical aspect of the Commerce
antidumping investigation. Commerce typically adjusts the foreign mar-
ket value and the U.S. price of the product under investigation for differ-
ences in delivery terms, physical characteristics, quantities sold, and
"levels of trade."64 Commerce also makes adjustments for other circum-
stances of sale that affect price comparability.
6
For example, Commerce deducts transportation expenses 66 from
both the foreign market value67 and the U.S. price68 of the subject mer-
chandise. Similarly, if the merchandise sold in the foreign market and
the U.S. market have different physical characteristics, Commerce makes
an adjustment to foreign market value to take into account this difference
as well. 69 This adjustment is limited to the difference between the mate-
rial and labor costs incurred by the merchandise sold in the foreign mar-
ket and that sold in the U.S. market.7'
63 See id; U.S. Department of Commerce, Study of Antidumping Methodology and Recommen-
dation For Statutory Change, 6 (Nov. 1985); Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at 539.
64 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.55-.58 (1989).
65 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1990).
66 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677a(dX2)(A), 1677b(aX1) (1988). Transportation or delivery expenses (ie.,
movement charges) include freight, insurance, customs brokerage charges, and the like. Id; 19
C.F.R. § 353.41(b).
67 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (1990). Commerce also makes an addition to foreign market value
for packing costs incurred as a result of delivering the corresponding U.S. merchandise to the U.S.
market. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(aX1) (1989). Commerce similarly makes a deduction to foreign
market value for home-market packing costs when such costs are included in the final selling price of
the merchandise destined for the home market. Id.
68 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2)(A) (1990). Furthermore, Commerce makes an addition to U.S. price
for the following items: (1) U.S. packing costs when not included in the final selling price of the U.S.
merchandise; (2) import duties or taxes collected on the home-market merchandise, but rebated or
not collected on the U.S. export merchandise; and (3) countervailing duties imposed on the same
merchandise subject to the antidumping action. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)
(1989). Commerce also makes a deduction to U.S. price for any export taxes collected in the country
of exportation. Id.
69 19 C.F.R. § 353.57 (1989). Commerce attempts to compare merchandise sold in the U.S.
market with identical merchandise sold in the home market or third-country market. Id. If the
foreign exporter does not sell identical merchandise in both the U.S. market and the foreign market,
then Commerce compares the U.S. merchandise with the foreign merchandise having the most simi-
lar physical characteristics to the U.S. merchandise. Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at
542.
70 See id. To make a symmetrical comparison between similar, but not identical, merchandise,
Commerce makes a difference-in-merchandise ("Difmer") adjustment. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(c)
(1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.57 (1989). This adjustment is based upon the differences in the cost of
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To make a symmetrical comparison between the home-market or
third-country merchandise and the merchandise sold in the United
states, Commerce also seeks, if feasible, to compare merchandise sold in
similar quantities71 and at the same "level of trade."' 72 If, for example, a
foreign exporter sells the subject merchandise in relatively large quanti-
ties to distributors in both markets, but sells such merchandise in rela-
tively small quantities to retailers in those markets, then Commerce
usually will compare distributor sales separately from retail sales. 3
Likewise, if the foreign exporter sells the subject merchandise at one
"level of trade" in the foreign market (e.g., distributor sales) and at a
different "level of trade" in the U.S. market (e.g., retail sales), then Com-
merce will attempt to make a price adjustment to recognize this differ-
ence as well.74
Finally, Commerce makes a variety of circumstance-of-sale adjust-
ments for expenses incurred as a direct result of selling the subject mer-
chandise in both the foreign market and the U.S. market.75 Direct selling
expenses are expenses that a foreign exporter incurs only if it makes a
sale of the subject merchandise.76 Examples include credit costs, com-
materials, labor, and variable factory overhead incurred to manufacture the merchandise sold in the
foreign market and the U.S. market. Id. If the merchandise sold in the U.S. market incurs greater
manufacturing costs as a result of different physical characteristics than the merchandise sold in the
home market or third-country market, then Commerce makes an addition to foreign market value.
Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at 542. If, however, the merchandise sold in the home
market or third-country market incurs greater manufacturing costs, then Commerce makes a deduc-
tion to foreign market value. Id.
71 19 C.F.R. § 353.55 (1989).
72 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1989).
73 19 C.F.R. § 353.55(a) (1989). A foreign exporter often may sell the subject merchandise in
relatively large quantities to distributors in both the foreign market and the U.S. market, but in
relatively small quantities to retailers in the foreign market only. If the exporter can demonstrate
that it charges its foreign distributor and retailer customers different prices because of different quan-
tities sold to these customers, then Commerce usually will exclude the smaller quantity retail sales
for purposes of calculating foreign market value. See NAR, S.p.A. v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 553
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989); Digital Readout Systems and Subassemblies Thereof From Japan Final Deter-
mination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,844 (1988). Commerce will compare only
foreign distributor sales with U.S. distributor sales under such circumstances to calculate a dumping
margin. Id. If, however, the foreign exporter fails to establish that a correlation exists between
prices charged and quantities sold to its foreign distributor and retailer customers, then Commerce
will compare both foreign retail sales and foreign distributor sales with U.S. distributor sales to
calculate a dumping margin. See Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061,
21,065 (1990) (first antidumping duty administrative review); Certain Steel Pails from Mexico; Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,245, 12,246 (1990).
74 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1989). Because quantifying such an adjustment is an extremely difficult
task, Commerce rarely makes a "level of trade" adjustment to foreign market value.
75 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.56 (1989).
76 See Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,061, 21,062 (1990) (first
antidumping duty administrative review). A revenue item or expense item must be "directly re-
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws
11:177(1990)
missions, warranties, and technical services. 77 Commerce, however, does
not grant such an adjustment for so-called "exchange-rate gains" that a
foreign exporter may realize as a result of receiving payment for its U.S.
sales well after the date of sale.78 An exporter can recognize such gains
when its foreign currency is depreciating relative to the U.S. dollar dur-
ing the period under investigation. 79
The reason that Commerce does not make a circumstance-of-sale
adjustment for exchange-rate gains is that these gains typically are not
"directly related" to the sale of the product under investigation."0 In
other words, these gains usually do not constitute one of the material
terms of the sales agreement and are not contingent upon exportation. 1
In the antidumping duty investigation of Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking
Ware from Mexico, Commerce denied the Mexican respondents' claimed
adjustment for exchange-rate gains for similar reasoning.82
When U.S. price is based upon purchase price,8 Commerce makes
deductions from and additions to foreign market value to reflect any dif-
ferences in direct selling expenses incurred by the subject merchandise in
the foreign and U.S. markets.84 Commerce generally does not make a
circumstance-of-sale adjustment for indirect selling expenses under such
circumstances. 85 Indirect selling expenses are those expenses (e.g., sales-
men's salaries, office rent) that a foreign exporter incurs regardless of
whether it makes a sale of the subject merchandise.86
lated" to the sale of the product under investigation to be entitled to a circumstance-of-sale adjust-
ment. 19 C.F.R. § 353.56 (1989).
77 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a)(2) (1989).
78 See Certain Granite Products From Italy; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
Value, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,187 (1988); Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Porcelain-
on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,435 (1986); Potassium Permanganate From
Spain; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,589 (1983).
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,435 (final determination).
83 When there are purchase price and exporter's sales price transactions involved in an an-
tidumping proceeding, Commerce must calculate two foreign market values - one for comparison
with purchase price sales and another for comparison with exporter's sales price sales. Hypothetical
Calculations, supra note 48, at 540. When U.S. price is based upon purchase price, Commerce calcu-
lates foreign market value based upon the price at the time the producer or reseller sells the mer-
chandise for exportation to the United States. 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(a)(2) (1989). When U.S. price is
based upon the exporter's sales price, Commerce calculates foreign market value based upon the
price at the time the related U.S. importer sells the merchandise in the United States to an unrelated
U.S. customer. 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(a)(3) (1989).
84 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a)(1),(2) (1989).
85 Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at 541, 546, 551.
86 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:177(1990)
When U.S. price is based upon the exporter's sales price, the rele-
vant provisions of the Tariff Act require Commerce to make adjustments
for both direct and indirect selling expenses.8 7 Accordingly, Commerce
deducts from the foreign market value of the subject merchandise direct
and indirect selling expenses incurred by that merchandise in the foreign
market.88 Commerce also deducts from the U.S. price of the subject
merchandise direct selling expenses (e.g., commissions) 9 and indirect
selling expenses' incurred by that merchandise in the U.S. market. Fi-
nally, Commerce deducts from the U.S. price any value added to the
foreign merchandise after importation into the United States.91
To be entitled to any of these price adjustments, the foreign exporter
must demonstrate to the satisfaction of Commerce that an adjustment is
warranted in a particular case.92 A foreign exporter has the opportunity
to satisfy this burden of proof through the submission of written informa-
tion and data to Commerce.93 If the foreign exporter fails to satisfy this
burden of proof, then Commerce will deny the claimed price
adjustment.94
One of the final tasks that Commerce must undertake to achieve an
ex-factory price comparison is to convert a foreign currency into U.S.
dollars.95 Because the foreign market value of the subject merchandise is
originally denominated in a foreign currency, and because the U.S. price
of that merchandise is denominated in U.S. dollars, Commerce must con-
87 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(1),(2) (1990); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1990); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.56(b)(2) (1989). In an exporter's sales price situation, Commerce deducts from the U.S. price
of the subject merchandise the indirect selling expenses that the foreign exporter incurs in the U.S.
market. Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at 541. Commerce also deducts from the foreign
market value of the subject merchandise the indirect selling expenses that the foreign exporter incurs
in the home market or third-country market 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b)(2). This latter adjustment is
commonly referred to as the "ESP offset". Id.; Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at 541. This
offset is limited or "capped" by the amount of the indirect selling expenses that the foreign exporter
incurs in the United States. Id. This aspect of the adjustment is commonly referred to as the "ESP
cap". Id.
88 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a)(1),(2) (1989).
89 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(1) (1990).
90 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) (1990). These expenses are typically those costs incurred by the U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign exporter to maintain operations in the United States (eg., sales offices, ware-
house facilities). A foreign exporter, however, can incur such expenses in the country of manufac-
ture (e.g., maintenance of a warehouse located in the country of manufacture that is used for storage
of U.S. export merchandise). Hypothetical Calculations, supra note 48, at 541.
91 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(3) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(3) (1989).
92 19 C.F.R. § 353.54 (1989).
93 19 C.F.R. § 353.31 (1989).
94 19 C.F.R. § 353.54 (1989).
95 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.60 (1989).
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vert foreign market value into U.S. dollars to compare foreign prices with
U.S. prices in U.S. dollars.
The Commerce regulations set forth a general rule for currency con-
version that the agency typically applies in the majority of antidumping
proceedings.96 This rule requires Commerce to use the exchange rate in
effect on the date of the corresponding U.S. sale, as certified by the-Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York ("Federal Reserve") and published by
the U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury Department") in the
U.S. Customs Bulletin.97
The exchange rate in effect on the date of the U.S. sale is usually the
current quarterly exchange rate certified by the Federal Reserve and pub-
lished by the Treasury Department.9" If, however, a current quarterly
rate does not exist, or if the current quarterly rate varies by at least five
percent from the daily exchange rates, as certified by the Federal Re-
serve, then the general rule for currency conversion requires Commerce
to use the certified daily exchange rates to convert foreign currency into
U.S. dollars.99
Application of the general rule for currency conversion has not been
a straightforward task for Commerce in antidumping duty proceedings
involving products from Mexico. In the antidumping duty investigations
involving Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico and Certain
Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico, for example, the Federal Reserve certi-
fied, and the Treasury Department published, two exchange rates for
Mexico during the periods under investigation." These rates were the
official, or the government "controlled," exchange rate and the "free"
exchange rate.101
Mexican law at the time of these antidumping proceedings required
all Mexican exporters to use the official exchange rate, rather than the
free exchange rate, to conduct all of their export transactions involving
manufactured products.1 "2 Because the official exchange rate, rather
than the free rate, reflected the actual exchange-rate experience of the
Mexican exporters subject to the above antidumping proceedings, Com-
merce selected the official, or "controlled," exchange rate to convert
96 See 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.60(a)(1989).
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,435 (final determination);
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico, 52 Fed. Reg. at 6,361 (final determination).
101 Id.
102 Id.
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Mexican pesos into U.S. dollars.103
Sometime during 1986, the Federal Reserve discontinued certifying,
and the Treasury Department discontinued publishing, exchange rates
for Mexico. 104 Commerce has since used the exchange rates published by
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") as a reasonable surrogate for
Federal Reserve exchange rates.105 In the case of Mexico, Commerce
generally considers the exchange rates published by the IMF to be the
most accurate and reliable substitute for Federal Reserve exchange
rates. 106
The Commerce regulations also set forth a special rule for currency
conversion."7 This special rule authorizes Commerce to use an ex-
change rate other than that in effect on the date of the U.S. sale to con-
vert foreign market value into U.S. dollars.'08 The purpose of the special
rule is to avoid penalizing a foreign exporter when sudden exchange rate
movements, beyond the exporter's control, artificially create dumping
margins.'0 9
Commerce considers invoking the special rule for currency conver-
sion in only two situations: (1) when the foreign currency is experiencing
a sudden appreciation, rather than a depreciation, relative to the U.S.
103 Id.; Cf. Pistachio Group of Ass'n of Food Indus. v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 848 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988) (Commerce selects exchange rate that reflects exporter's actual exchange rate experi-
ence where multiple exchange rates available to agency); 19 C.F.R. § 159.36(b) (1989) (Customs
regulations require Customs to use exchange rate that "is uniformly applicable under the laws and
regulations of the country of exportation" where Federal Reserve certifies multiple exchange rates).
104 Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 21,061.
105 See, e.g., Certain Steel Pails From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 12,245 (final determination).
106 Id.; Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 21,063 (fist antidumping
duty administrative review); Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Gray Portland
Cement and Clinker From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 29,244 (final determination).
107 19 C.F.R. § 353.60(b) (1989).
108 See id. If the foreign currency has experienced a sudden appreciation relative to the U.S.
dollar during the period of investigation, and if the foreign exporter has made a good faith effort to
revise its prices in response to such an exchange-rate movement, then Commerce typically will use
the exchange rate in effect during the previous calendar quarter (La, a so-called "90-day lag") to
convert foreign market value into U.S. dollars. Melamine in Crystal Form from the Netherlands;
Antidumping: Amendment of Final Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 29,619 (1980), aff'd, Melamine
Chemical, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Certain Iron Metal Castings from
India; Antidumping: Final Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 39869
(1981). If the foreign currency is experiencing a temporary fluctuation relative to the U.S. dollar
during the relevant period, and if dumping margins are due solely to Commerce's using the daily
exchange rates, instead of the current quarterly exchange rate, to convert currencies, then Com-
merce usually will use the current quarterly exchange rate, rather than daily exchange rates, to
convert foreign market value into U.S. dollars. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.60(b) (1989). Commerce makes
this adjustment, because it is usually beyond the control of the foreign exporter to revise its prices
when a temporary exchange-rate fluctuation exists. See Melamine, 732 F.2d at 924.
109 Melamine Chemical Inc. Y. United States, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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dollar during the period of investigation; or (2) when the foreign cur-
rency is experiencing a temporary fluctuation (i.e., an uncertain shift
back and forth) during that period."10 Commerce systematically declines
invoking the special rule when a foreign currency is depreciating relative
to the U.S. dollar.111 The rationale underlying this administrative prac-
tice is that only an appreciating foreign currency has the potential to
create artificial dumping margins. 112 By contrast, a foreign currency that
is depreciating relative to the U.S. dollar tends to eliminate dumping
margins.
1 1 3
In the antidumping duty investigations of Porcelain-on-Steel Cook-
ing Ware From Mexico and Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico,
Commerce declined to invoke the special rule for currency conversion.11
110 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.60(b) (1989); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 36,435; Certain Iron Metal Castings from India; Antidumping: Final Determination of Sales
at Not Less Than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,869 (1981).
111 See, e g., Pads for Woodwind Instrument Keys from Italy; Final Determination of Sales At Less
Than Fair Value; 49 Fed. Reg. 28295, 28297 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica
Accessori Instrumenti Musicali v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 255, 260 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)(where
Commerce declined to invoke special rule because foreign currency depreciated relative to U.S. dol-
lar during period of investigation); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. at
36,435 (final determination)(same).
112 The following hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume, for example, that 10 Mexican pesos
exchange for one U.S. dollar. Assume, further, that, after taking into account price adjustments, a
Mexican exporter charges the same price for its merchandise in the Mexican home market and the
U.S. market: 50 pesos (U.S. $5.00) in the Mexican home market and U.S. $5.00 in the United States.
Commerce would find no dumping margins under such circumstances. See infra note 117 and ac-
companying text. If the Mexican peso were to appreciate by 50 percent relative to the U.S. dollar, so
that five pesos could be exchanged for one U.S. dollar, and if the Mexican exporter were to maintain
the same home-market and U.S. prices, then the price of the home-market merchandise, as expressed
in U.S. dollars, would increase on a per unit basis from U.S. $5.00 to U.S. $10.00. Meanwhile, the
U.S. price would remain unchanged at U.S. $5.00. Commerce would calculate a dumping margin of
100 percent under such circumstances. See id. The net result is that the dumping margin in this
hypothetical is due solely to the 50 percent appreciation of the Mexican peso relative to the U.S.
dollar. See also Palmeter, Exchange Rates and Antidumping Determinations, 22 J. WORLD TRADE
73 (1988).
113 Now assume that 10 Mexican pesos exchange for one U.S. dollar. Assume, further, that, after
taking into account price adjustments, a Mexican exporter charges 100 pesos (U.S. $10.00) for its
merchandise in the Mexican home market and U.S. $5.00 in the United States. Commerce would
calculate a dumping margin of 100 percent under such a scenario. See infra note 117 and accompa-
nying text. If the Mexican peso were to depreciate by 100 percent relative to the U.S. dollar, so that
20 Mexican pesos could be exchanged for one U.S. dollar, and if the foreign exporter were to main-
tain the same home-market and U.S. prices, then the price of the home-market merchandise, as
expressed in U.S. dollars, would decrease on a per unit basis from U.S. $10.00 to U.S. $5.00. Mean-
while, the U.S. price would remain unchanged at U.S. $5.00. Commerce would find no dumping
margins under such circumstances. See id. The net result is that a 100 percent depreciation of the
Mexican peso relative to the U.S. dollar is the sole cause of the elimination of dumping margins in
this hypothetical.
114 51 Fed. Reg. at 36,435; 52 Fed. Reg. at 6,365.
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In those investigations, Commerce found that the Mexican peso had ex-
perienced a steady and sustained depreciation, rather than an apprecia-
tion or temporary fluctuation, relative to the U.S. dollar during the
relevant periods.115 As a result, Commerce converted Mexican pesos
into U.S. dollars in accordance with the general rule for currency
conversion. 116
4. Hypothetical Dumping Cakulation
The following example illustrates the adjustments that Commerce
makes to foreign market value and to U.S. price to calculate a dumping
margin. Assume the following scenario: a Mexican producer of tequila,
Compaflia Giezzero, exports the subject merchandise to the United
States; the peso is the official currency of Mexico; Compafiia Giezzero
sells each pint of tequila at 1,500 pesos in the Mexican home market and
at U.S. $1.20 in the U.S. market; and the date of the relevant U.S. sales to
the first unrelated U.S. customer occurs before importation of the subject
merchandise into the United States (Le., purchase price sales).
Assume, further, that the Mexican peso has depreciated by 100 per-
cent relative to the U.S. dollar over the past two calendar quarters from 5
pesos/l U.S. dollar on the first day of the previous calendar quarter to 10
pesos/1 U.S. dollar on the first day of the current calendar quarter. As-
sume, moreover, that the value of the Mexican peso relative to that of the
U.S. dollar remains stable throughout the current calendar quarter and
that all sales of the subject merchandise occur during the current calen-
dar quarter. Finally, assume that Compafila Giezzero incurs only credit
costs in the amount of 250 pesos in the Mexican home market and trans-
portation costs in the amount of U.S. $0.20 in the U.S. market.
Commerce would reduce the foreign market value (i.e., the home-
market price) under such circumstances by 250 pesos, the credit costs
incurred by Compafiia Giezzero in the Mexican home market, to arrive
at an ex-factory price of 1,250 pesos. Commerce also would reduce the
U.S. price by U.S. $0.20, the transportation costs incurred by Compafila
Giezzero in the U.S. market, to arrive at an ex-factory price of U.S.
$1.00. Commerce then would convert foreign market value, as denomi-
nated in Mexican pesos, into U.S. dollars to calculate a dumping margin.
Because the Mexican peso in this example experienced a deprecia-
tion, rather than an appreciation or fluctuation, relative to the U.S. dollar
during the relevant period, Commerce would not invoke its special rule
115 Id.
116 Id.
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for currency conversion. Instead, Commerce would apply its general
rule for currency conversion to convert Mexican pesos into U.S. dollars
to calculate foreign market value in U.S. dollars.
Because the current quarterly exchange rate was stable and, as a
result, did not vary by at least five percent from the daily exchange rates,
Commerce would use the current quarterly exchange rate of 10 pesos/i
U.S. dollar to convert foreign market value into U.S. dollars. Such a
currency conversion would yield a foreign market value of U.S. $1.25.
Because Commerce calculates dumping margins by dividing the differ-
ence between the foreign market value and the U.S. price of the subject
merchandise (ie., U.S. $0.25 in this example) by the U.S. price (Le., U.S.
$1.00), Commerce would calculate a dumping margin of 25 percent for
Compaiia Giezzero in this hypothetical.117
D. The ITC Injury Determination
The ITC must determine whether the imports sold at less than fair
value in the United States are a cause of or threaten material injury to a
U.S. domestic industry.118 A majority of the Commissioners employ a
three-step analysis to make this determination. In accordance with this
analysis, the ITC first must define the relevant U.S. domestic industry,
then must ascertain whether this industry is experiencing material injury
or the threat of material injury, and finally must determine whether the
imports sold at less than fair value in the U.S. market are a cause of this
injury. 119
To define the relevant U.S. domestic industry, the ITC must deter-
mine which domestically manufactured product or products are "like" or
"in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the
[imported] article subject to an [antidumping] investigation." 120 The def-
inition that the ITC gives to the term "like product" defines the U.S.
domestic industry for purposes of U.S. antidumping proceedings. 121
The Tariff Act authorizes the ITC to define the U.S. domestic indus-
117 For a detailed discussion of all the adjustments that Commerce makes to foreign market value
and to U.S. price, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Study of Antidumping Methodology and
Recommendations For Statutory Change (November 1985); see also Hypothetical Calculations, supra
note 48, at 537-553.
118 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1988). The standard of injury under the U.S. antidumping law is the
same as that under the U.S. countervailing duty law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a); 1677(7) (1990). Sec-
tion 771(7) of the Tariff Act defines "material injury" as harm that is "not inconsequential, immate-
rial or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1990).
119 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4),(7) (1990).
120 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1990); see also Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, and Taiwan, U.S. ITC Pub. 1911, 4-7 (Nov., 1986) (Final).
121 See id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (1990).
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try on a national basis122 or, "[iln appropriate circumstances, 123 on a
regional basis.'24 The "regional industry" provision enables the ITC to
render an affirmative injury determination "even if the [U.S.] domestic
industry as a whole"' 25 is not experiencing material injury or the threat
of such injury by reason of dumped imports.126 If the U.S. domestic pro-
ducers that comprise the regional industry can demonstrate that "there is
a concentration of... dumped imports into... an isolated [regional]
market,"' 2 7 and if these producers also can establish to the satisfaction of
the ITC that they are experiencing injury by reason of such imports, then
the ITC may render an affirmative injury determination. 128
In the recent injury investigation involving Gray Portland Cement
and Cement Clinker From Mexico, the ITC defined the U.S. domestic
cement industry on a regional basis to include only the following U.S.
states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Mexico, and Texas. 12 9 Partly because the ITC analyzed data from
only this geographic region, rather than from the entire United States,
and partly because these data demonstrated that this regional industry
was experiencing material injury by reason of dumped imports of Mexi-
can origin, the ITC issued an affirmative final determination. 3 '
To determine whether a U.S. domestic industry is experiencing ma-
terial injury, the ITC typically analyzes information covering a three-
year period regarding such factors as U.S. domestic output, sales, market
122 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1990).
123 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C) (1990).
124 Id. The Tariff Act authorizes the ITC to divide a U.S. national market into two or more
regional markets and to treat the U.S. producers within each such market as a separate industry
when the following statutory conditions exist:
(i) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the like product
in question in that market, and
(ii) the demand in that market is not supplied, to any substantial degree, by producers of the
product in question located elsewhere in the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C)(i),(ii) (1990).
125 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C) (1990).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker From Mexico, USITC Pub. No. 2305, Inv. No.
731-TA-451 (1990)(Final). This determination is currently subject to a judicial challenge. CEMEX
Summons, Ct. No. 90-10-00509 (Sep. 28, 1990).
130 USITC Pub. No. 2305, Inv. No. 731-TA-451 (1990)(Final). Another factor that contributed
to the affirmative final injury determination in the Mexican cement investigation was that the Tariff
Act required the ITC to cumulate the volume of dumped imports from Mexico with the volume of
dumped imports from Japan. Id. at 25; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1990). Imports of Japanese
cement were the subject of a concurrent antidumping duty investigation at the time that the ITC
rendered its final determination in the Mexican investigation. USITC Pub. No. 2305 at 25. For a
further discussion of the concept of cumulation, see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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share, profit, production, return on investment, capacity utilization, cash
flow, inventory levels, employment, wages, ability to raise capital, and
investment. 131 A downward trend in these factors usually is an indicator
of injury. 132 No one factor in and of itself, however, is determinative of a
material injury finding.1 33
To determine whether imports sold at less than fair value in the U.S.
market are a cause of material injury to a U.S. domestic industry, the
ITC analyzes the volume of such imports, as well as the effect that such
imports have upon U.S. producers' prices of the "like product" and upon
the economic health of such producers. 134 If "like" imports from two or
more foreign countries are subject to the antidumping duty investigation,
and if such imports compete with one another and with the "like prod-
uct" manufactured by the U.S. domestic industry, then the ITC must
cumulate the volume and effect of such imports to determine material
injury.13 5 In the injury investigation involving Porcelain-on-Steel Cook-
ing Ware From Mexico, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, for
example, the ITC cumulated the volume of Mexican imports with the
volume of imports from the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.
136
In undertaking its causation analysis, the ITC also seeks to ascertain
whether the imports sold at less than fair value in the United States have
contributed to price depression or price suppression of the "like product"
manufactured and sold by the U.S. industry in the U.S. market. 137 If a
positive relationship exists between such imports and depressed U.S.
prices of the "like product," and if the economic health of the U.S. do-
mestic industry is simultaneously deteriorating, then the ITC may con-
clude that such imports are a cause of material injury to a U.S. domestic
industry. 138
To determine whether a U.S. domestic industry is threatened with
material injury by reason of imports sold at less than fair value in the
131 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1990).
132 See id.
133 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(EXii) (1990).
134 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1990).
135 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1990). Additionally, the ITC must cumulate the volume of im-
ports, if any, from countries subject to a concurrent but separate antidumping or countervailing duty
proceeding with the volume of imports subject to the antidumping duty proceeding actually before
the ITC. See Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Indu., Inc. v United States, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir.
1987). If, however, imports from a country under investigation are negligible and have no discerni-
ble adverse impact upon the U.S. industry, then the ITC is not required to cumulate such imports
with imports from other countries. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(v) (1990).
136 51 Fed. Reg. 42,946 (1986)(Final).
137 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii) (1990).
138 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B),(C) (1990).
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U.S. market, the ITC evaluates the following factors: excess capacity, if
any, in the country of exportation; the potential for increasing the pro-
duction of the subject merchandise in the exporting country; a rapid in-
crease, if any, in U.S. market penetration; and a substantial increase in
U.S. inventories.' 3 9 The ITC also examines the ability of the U.S. domes-
tic industry to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the "like
product," as well as the probability that imports of the subject merchan-
dise will depress or suppress U.S. prices of the "like product" in the fu-
ture. 11 No one factor, in and of itself, is dispositive of threat of material
injury.14
E. Statutory And Regulatory Procedures Governing Antidumping
Duty Investigations
1. Initiation of Investigation
The Tariff Act authorizes Commerce to self-initiate 142 an antidump-
ing investigation or to initiate such an investigation based upon the filing
of a petition by a U.S. "interested party" (the "petitioner"). 143 A U.S.
"interested party" can include, among other entities, a U.S. domestic
manufacturer, trade union, or trade association engaged in the manufac-
ture, production, or wholesale of the "like product" in the United
States. 1" When the petitioner files an antidumping petition with Com-
merce, it also must file the petition simultaneously with the ITC.145
Upon the filing of an antidumping petition, the ITC typically issues
139 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F) (1990).
140 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(IV),(X) (1990).
141 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (1990).
142 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (1990); 19 C.F.1L § 353.11 (1989); see Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors of256 Kilobits and Above From Japan; Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation,
50 Fed. Reg. 51,450 (1985).
143 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1990). The U.S. antidumping duty law authorizes the following
entities to file a petition: (1) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a "like
product"; (2) a certified or recognized union or group of workers that represents an industry engaged
in the manufacture, production, or wholesale of the "like product" in the United States; (3) a U.S.
trade or business association the majority of whose members manufacture, produce, or wholesale the
"like product" in the United States; or (4) a coalition of firms or trade associations that is engaged in
the manufacture of the "like product." Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C)-(F) (1990); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.2(k)(3)-(k)(6) (1989). In the case of agricultural products, a U.S. coalition or trade association
of "processors and producers" or "processors and growers" may file a petition so long as such action
is consistent with U.S. international obligations arising under the GATT. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(9)(G) (1990). Furthermore, the U.S. antidumping duty law requires Commerce and the ITC
to provide technical assistance to small U.S. businesses to enable such entities to prepare and file
antidumping duty petitions. 19 U.S.C. § 1339(b)) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.12(h) (1989).
144 See id.
145 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(2) (1990).
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a questionnaire (ie., request for information) 1" to the U.S. domestic
manufacturers or producers of the "like product" and to the U.S. import-
ers of the subject merchandise. 47 The ITC generally does not send ques-
tionnaires to the foreign exporters subject to the antidumping duty
action.148  Rather, the ITC requests the U.S. embassy in the exporting
country to gather economic information concerning such exporters. 4 9
In addition, the ITC requests the representatives of any foreign ex-
porters that are participating in the investigation to submit the following
information: the volume of imports of the subject merchandise entered
into the United States; shipments of that merchandise in the home mar-
ket or third-country market; and capacity utilization and actual produc-
tion capabilities in the country of manufacture. 5 The ITC requests
these exporters to provide the information for the most recent three-year
period.151 The ITC also requests information concerning any plans of
these exporters to expand production capacity in the country of manu-
facture, third countries, and the United States. 52
Within 20 days after the filing of the petition, Commerce must de-
termine whether the petition is legally sufficient to warrant the initiation
of an investigation. 53 If Commerce initiates an investigation, then it
usually will issue a questionnaire to the foreign exporters that account for
at least 60 percent of the imports of the subject merchandise to the
United States.1 54
The Commerce questionnaire requests detailed transactional data
146 Interview with Mr. Edward Easton, former Assistant General Counsel, U.S. ITC (Nov. 5,
1990) [hereinafter "Easton Interview"].
147 Id. The "subject merchandise" is the merchandise that the foreign manufacturer exports to,
and the U.S. importer imports into, the United States. 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(m) (1989). The "like
product" is the domestically manufactured product that is "like" or "in the absence of like, most
similar in characteristics and uses with, the [imported] article subject to an [antidumping] investiga-
tion." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1990).
148 Easton Interview.
149 Id.
150 Id. The foreign exporter and its legal representatives, if any, must certify that all factual
information submitted to the ITC is accurate and complete to the best of the exporter's or counsels'
knowledge. 19 C.F.R. § 207.3 (1989).
151 Easton Interview.
152 If the foreign exporter refuses or simply is unable to provide the requested information in a
timely manner, or if the foreign exporter significantly impedes the completion of the antidumping
duty investigation, then the ITC may rely upon the "best information otherwise available" to render
an injury determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 207.8 (1989). Reliance upon the
"best information otherwise available" may influence the ITC to render an automatic affirmative
determination with regard to the threat of material injury. Easton Interview.
153 19 U.S.C. 1673a(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. 353.13 (1989). For a description of the petition require-
ments, see 19 C.F.1L § 353.12 (1989).
154 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(b) (1989).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:177(1990)
for all home-market sales, third-country sales, if any, and U.S. sales dur-
ing the period of investigation.'55 Completing the Commerce question-
naire is probably the single most important task that a foreign exporter
will undertake during the course of an antidumping duty proceeding. A
foreign exporter usually has 30-45 days to complete this questionnaire
accurately.156 A foreign exporter, however, has the opportunity to sub-
mit a supplemental questionnaire response to correct any deficiencies
identified by Commerce in the original response.' 57
Failure to complete the questionnaire accurately and in a timely
manner may cause Commerce to rely upon the "best information other-
wise available"' 58 to calculate dumping margins. Commerce typically
selects under such circumstances the dumping margin alleged by the pe-
titioner in the petition.'59 Because the dumping margin in the petition is
usually quite high, reliance upon the "best information otherwise avail-
able" usually has an adverse impact upon a foreign exporter.
Foreign exporters usually are reluctant to disclose their business
proprietary (Le., confidential) information to a foreign agency. To safe-
guard an exporter's business proprietary information submitted in the
questionnaire responses, Commerce and the ITC maintain such informa-
tion in the strictest confidence in accordance with an administrative pro-
tective order ("APO"). 6
Pursuant to an APO, only the following individuals can gain access
to a foreign exporter's business proprietary information: those Commerce-
or ITC employees directly involved in the antidumping duty proceeding;
the exporter's own legal representatives; and the petitioner's legal repre-
sentatives.'61 The corporate officials of the U.S. domestic petitioner gen-
155 See, eg., Commerce Questionnaire issued to Troqueles y Esmaltes (February, 16, 1989) in
Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,186 (1990) (second antidumping
duty administrative review). The foreign exporter and its legal representatives, if any, must certify
that all factual information submitted to Commerce in the questionnaire response is accurate and
complete to the best of the exporter's or counsels' knowledge. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (1990); 19
C.F.R. § 353.31(i) (1989).
156 See Troqueles y Esmaltes Questionnaire, supra note 155.
157 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(b) (1989).
158 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1990). Section 776(c) of the Tariff Act empowers Commerce to rely
upon "the best information otherwise available" to establish dumping margins when a foreign ex-
porter refuses or simply is unable to provide to Commerce complete, timely, or accurate informa-
tion. Id; 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(a)(1) (1989). Section 776(b) also empowers Commerce to rely upon
such information when the agency is unable to verify the accuracy or completeness of the informa-
tion submitted by the foreign exporter in the questionnaire response. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)
(1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(a)(2) (1989).
159 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(b) (1989).
160 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f (1990); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.31 - .34; 19 C.F.R. § 207.7 (1989).
161 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b),(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.34; 19 C.F.IL § 207.7 (1989).
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erally cannot gain access to such information. 62 Furthermore, a foreign
exporter has the legal right, pursuant to the U.S. antidumping law, to
request that only Commerce or ITC officials be permitted to examine
extremely confidential information, such as trade secrets. 163
To guard against the unauthorized use or release of a foreign ex-
porter's business proprietary information, Commerce and the ITC have
the legal authority pursuant to the Tariff Act to impose severe sanctions
upon a violating party. 164 Such sanctions include the termination of an
antidumping duty investigation already in progress, the disbarment of
the violators from practicing before Commerce or the ITC, and the de-
nial of further access to a foreign exporter's business proprietary
information. 16
5
2. Preliminary ITC and Commerce Determinations
Both the ITC and Commerce must render preliminary determina-
tions based upon the information contained in the questionnaire re-
sponses submitted to those agencies.' 6 6  To render an affirmative
preliminary determination, the ITC must be satisfied that there exists a
"reasonable indication" of material injury or the threat of material injury
to the relevant U.S. domestic industry. 67
The "reasonable indication" standard is relatively lenient.161 In
other words, the quantum of injury information needed to trigger an af-
firmative preliminary determination is quite low. Significantly less infor-
mation is needed to trigger an affirmative preliminary determination than
is needed to trigger an affirmative final determination.' 69
If the ITC determines that a "reasonable indication" of injury or the
threat of injury does not exist and, as a result, renders a negative prelimi-
nary determination, then the entire antidumping duty investigation is ter-
minated.17 In 1986, for example, the ITC rendered a negative
preliminary determination in the antidumping duty investigation of Port-
162 19 C.F.R. § 207.7(a)(3Xii) (1989). An in-house corporate counsel of the petitioner may gain
access to a foreign exporter's business proprietary information under certain very limited circum-
stances. See id.
163 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(cXl) (1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 9,051-9,052 (1990) (to be codified at 19
C.F.R. § 353.34(a)) (interim final rule); 19 C.F.R. § 207.7(a)(1) (1989).
164 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(1)(B) (1990); 19 C.F.R § 354.3; 19 C.F.R. § 207.7(d) (1989).
165 Id.
166 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a),(b) (1990).
167 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1990).
168 See H. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1979); see also American Lamb Co. v. United
States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
169 See id.; compare 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1990) with 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1990).
170 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 207.18 (1989).
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land Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker From Colombia, France,
Greece, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Venezuela.1 71
As a result, the ITC terminated the entire antidumping proceeding in
accordance with the statutory scheme. 172  If, however, the ITC deter-
mines that a "reasonable indication" of material injury does exist and,
accordingly, renders an affirmative preliminary determination, then the
antidumping investigation continues at both Commerce and the ITC.173
If Commerce preliminarily determines that the foreign exporter is
selling the subject merchandise in the United States at less than fair
value, then Commerce directs Customs to "order the suspension of liqui-
dation."' 174 "Liquidation" is a term of art which means the "final com-
putation or ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an
entry" of imported merchandise.1 75 "Suspension of liquidation," there-
fore, simply means that Customs suspends the "final computation" of
customs duties, including antidumping duties, until Commerce deter-
mines, as discussed below, the actual amount of antidumping duties
owed to Customs. 176 Because suspension of liquidation has no impact on
the movement of the imported merchandise in the U.S. market, the for-
eign exporter may continue to sell its merchandise in that market.
Customs must suspend the liquidation of all entries of the subject
merchandise that enter into the customs territory of the United States on
or after the date of publication in the Federal Register of Commerce's
affirmative preliminary determination. 77 In exceptional circumstances,
Commerce may direct Customs to suspend the liquidation of entries
made 90 days before the publication date of the affirmative preliminary
determination. 78
171 Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker From Colombia, France, Greece, Japan,
Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Venezuela, 51 Fed. Reg. 46,945 (1986)(Preliminary).
172 Id.
173 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a),(b) (1990).
174 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1990). This procedure is in accordance with Article 10 of the GATT
Antidumping Code, which authorizes signatory countries to impose provisional measures for a pe-
riod not to exceed 120 days upon a preliminary finding of dumping. See GATT Antidumping Code,
supra note 17, art. 10.
175 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1989).
176 Id; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673(a), 1675(a) (1990).
177 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1) (1990).
178 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e)(2) (1990). The U.S. antidumping law authorizes Commerce to suspend
liquidation retroactively if, as a result of an allegation made by the petitioner, Commerce prelimina-
rily determines that critical circumstances exist. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 353.16 (1989). For critical circum-
stances to exist, Commerce must find that (1) there is a history of dumping in the United States or
elsewhere of the same class or kind of merchandise subject to the antidumping investigation, or the
importer knew or should have known that the foreign exporter was making sales of the subject
merchandise at less than fair value, and (2) there have been massive imports of the subject merchan-
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When Commerce directs Customs to suspend liquidation upon a
preliminary determination of dumping, the U.S. importer 179 - not the
foreign exporter - must make a cash deposit of estimated antidumping
duties with Customs, or post a bond or other security, for each entry of
the subject merchandise to cover any potential antidumping duty liabil-
ity.180 The amount of the cash deposit or the bond must be equal to the
estimated amount by which the foreign market value of the subject mer-
chandise exceeds its U.S. price. 81 A U.S. importer usually posts a bond
or other security, because that procedure is usually less expensive.
If Commerce preliminarily determines that the foreign exporter is
not selling the subject merchandise at less than fair value in the United
States and, consequently, issues a negative preliminary determination,
then no suspension of liquidation occurs, and the antidumping duty in-
vestigation simply continues toward a final determination at Com-
merce.18 2 In contrast to a negative preliminary determination rendered
by the ITC, a negative preliminary determination issued by Commerce
does not result in the termination of the entire antidumping duty
investigation. 183
3. Verification of Information Submitted in the Commerce
Questionnaire Response
The U.S. antidumping law requires Commerce to verify all informa-
tion upon which it relies in making a final determination.184 Specifically,
Commerce must verify the information contained in the foreign ex-
porter's questionnaire response.18 To verify this information, Com-
merce officials visit the exporter's premises to examine the company's
disc over a relatively short period. See id. If Commerce concludes in its final determination that
critical circumstances exist, and if the ITC concludes in its final determination that the retroactive
imposition of antidumping duties is necessary to prevent the recurrence of material injury, then any
suspension of liquidation ordered applies retroactively to any unliquidated entries of the subject
merchandise entered 90 days before the publication date of the Commerce affirmative preliminary
determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(3),(b)(4),(c)(4) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.16(d); 19 C.F.R.
§ 207.25(d)(1),(2) (1989).
179 The U.S. "importer of record" is legally responsible for paying antidumping duties to Cus-
toms. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.26 (1989). An "importer of record" is usually the U.S. importer, its
agent, or a customs broker. Foreign manufacturers or exporters also have the option of establishing
related U.S. subsidiaries that can operate as "importers of record". See 19 C.F.R. § 159.58(a)
(1989).
180 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(2) (1990); see supra note 174.
181 Id.
182 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b),(d) (1990).
183 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1990) with 19 U.S.C. § 1673b,(d) (1990).
184 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1990).
185 See id.
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financial books and records.
186
Participation in the verification process is probably the second most
important task that a foreign exporter will undertake during the course
of an antidumping duty proceeding. The foreign exporter must ensure
that the Commerce officials can trace and tie all the information that
Commerce decides to verify to the company's books and records. Failure
to do so may cause Commerce to rely upon, as discussed above, the "best
information otherwise available" ' 7 to establish dumping margins.
4. Final Commerce and ITC Determinations
If Commerce finds that the foreign exporter is not selling the subject
merchandise in the United States at less than fair value and, as a result,
renders a negative final determination, then the entire antidumping duty
investigation is terminated.' Commerce directs Customs under such
circumstances to terminate any suspension of liquidation that may be in
effect and to refund any estimated antidumping duties already deposited
or release any security posted. 8 9 If, however, Commerce finds that the
foreign exporter is selling the subject merchandise in the United States at
less than fair value and, accordingly, issues an affirmative final determi-
nation, then the antidumping duty investigation will continue at the
ITC.190
The legal standard evaluated by the ITC to determine the existence
of material injury or the threat of material injury during the final stage of
the injury investigation is more rigorous than that evaluated during the
preliminary stage of the investigation.'9 1 Consequently, it is not uncom-
mon for the ITC to render a negative final determination and, thereby,
terminate the entire antidumping proceeding. 192 In a recent antidump-
ing duty investigation involving Certain Steel Pails From Mexico, the
ITC concluded in its final determination that dumped imports of Mexi-
can steel pails were not a cause of material injury, or did not threaten
mnaterial injury, to the relevant U.S. domestic industry. 193 As a result,
the ITC terminated the antidumping investigation.
194
If, however, the ITC concludes that dumped imports are a cause of
186 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(c) (1989).
187 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(a)(2) (1989).
188 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (1990).
189 Id.
190 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(1) (1990).
191 See supra note 168.
192 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2),(3) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 207.25 (1989).
193 55 Fed. Reg. 20,316 (1990) (Final).
194 Id.
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material injury, or threaten material injury, to the U.S. domestic industry
and, as a result, issues an affirmative final determination, then Commerce
must publish in the Federal Register an antidumping duty order covering
the subject merchandise. 195 The antidumping duty order directs Cus-
toms to require the U.S. importer to make a cash deposit of estimated
antidumping duties. 196 The U.S. importer no longer has the option of
posting a bond or other security after the publication date of the an-
tidumping duty order. 197 The assessment or calculation of actual an-
tidumping duties, as discussed below, does not occur until Commerce
calculates actual dumping margins in a subsequent administrative
review. 19
8
5. Termination or Suspension of Investigation
The Tariff Act authorizes Commerce to terminate an antidumping
duty investigation based upon its own initiative if Commerce self-initi-
ated the investigation.199 The Tariff Act also authorizes Commerce to
terminate an antidumping investigation based upon the withdrawal of
the petition by the petitioner.2 °" Commerce may not authorize a termi-
nation of the investigation under either scenario, unless the agency is sat-
isfied that such action is in the public interest.201
Commerce may terminate an antidumping duty investigation by en-
tering into a quantitative restriction agreement with the foreign exporter
or exporters - provided that such a termination similarly is in the public
interest.2 °2 Because these agreements are extremely difficult to adminis-
ter and also raise issues under Article XI of the GATT,2 °3 Commerce
195 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(cX2), 1673e (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1989).
196 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(aX3) (1990).
197 1d; 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1989). If, however, Commerce is satisfied that it can calculate actual
or final antidumping duties within 90 days after the publication date of the antidumping duty order,
and if certain other statutory conditions exist, Commerce "may permit, for not more than 90 days
after the date of publication of an order... the posting of a bond or other security in lieu of the
deposit of estimated antidumping duties." 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(c) (1990).
198 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e(aXl), 1675(a) (1990).
199 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(aX1) (1990).
200 Id.
201 19 C.F.R. § 353.17(a) (1989).
202 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(aX2) (1990). Section 734(aX2)(B) of the Tariff Act sets forth the factors
that Commerce must evaluate to determine whether a quantitative restriction agreement is in the
public interest. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(aX2)(B) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.17(b)(2) (1989). Such factors
include (1) whether the agreement would have a greater adverse impact upon U.S. consumers than
the imposition of antidumping duties, (2) the relative impact that such an agreement would have
upon the international economic interests of the United States, and (3) the relative impact that such
an agreement would have upon the competitiveness of the relevant U.S. domestic industry. Id.
203 Article XI of the GAIT generally proscribes the imposition of quantitative restraints unless
one of the limited exceptions is applicable. GATT, supra note 2, art. XI. One such exception autho-
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often has declined to enter into such agreements with foreign exporters.
In the recent antidumping duty investigation of Portland Hydraulic Ce-
ment and Clinker From Mexico, for example, Commerce declined to
enter into a quantitative restriction agreement with Mexican exporters of
cement for precisely these reasons.
204
Commerce also may suspend an antidumping duty investigation
based upon one of three kinds of agreements.' 5 First, Commerce may
enter into a cessation agreement with the foreign exporters that account
for at least 85 percent of all of the imports of the subject merchandise to
the United States.2°6 The foreign exporters must pledge, pursuant to
such an agreement, to "cease exports of the merchandise to the United
States within 6 months after the date on which the investigation is sus-
pended. '2 7 Because a cessation agreement removes the foreign export-
ers from the U.S. market, foreign exporters rarely find such an agreement
to be an attractive option. Second, Commerce may enter into a price-
revision agreement with the foreign exporters that account for virtually
all of the imports of the subject merchandise.2 "8 In accordance with such
an agreement, the foreign exporters must agree to "revise their prices to
eliminate completely any amount by which the foreign market value of
the [subject] merchandise exceeds the United States price of that
merchandise."209
Finally, if "extraordinary circumstances '' 210 are present, Commerce
rizes a contracting importing country to impose on a nondiscriminating basis quantitative import
restraints upon agricultural and fishery products. Id. art XI, para. 2. Similarly, Article XII of the
GATT authorizes an importing country that is experiencing a balance-of-payments crisis to impose
quotas to safeguard its foreign exchange reserves. Id. art. XII.
204 55 Fed. Reg. at 29,244.
205 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(1),(2),(c) (1990). The U.S. antidumping law also authorizes Commerce
to suspend an antidumping duty investigation by means of a quantitative restriction agreement when
the investigation covers imports from a "nonmarket economy country" (eg., the Soviet Union). 19
U.S.C. § 1673c(l) (1990). The U.S. antidumping law defines the term "nonmarket economy coun-
try" to include "any foreign country that... does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing
structures." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (1990).
206 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(1) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(a)(2) (1989).
207 Id.
208 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(2) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(a)(1) (1989); see, eg., Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above From Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,707
(1986)(suspension of antidumping investigation based upon price-revision agreement); Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs) From Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,708 (1986)(same).
209 Id.
210 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(C)(2) (1990). Section 734(c)(2) of the Tariff Act defines the phrase "ex-
traordinary circumstances" to mean circumstances in which (1) the suspension of the investigation
will be more beneficial to the U.S. domestic industry than the continuance of the investigation, and
(2) the investigation is complex (Le., large number of transactions, novel issues, or large number of
firms involved). Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 353.18(d) (1989).
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may enter into another kind of price-revision agreement whereby the for-
eign exporters agree to "eliminate completely the injurious effect" of the
unfairly traded imports.21' Commerce may not enter into any of the
above suspension agreements unless it determines that such action is in
the public interest.212
F. Assessment or Imposition of Antidumping Duties
Based upon a request from an "interested party," Commerce will
conduct an administrative review of the antidumping duty order each
year beginning on the anniversary of the publication date of the order.213
An "interested party" for purposes of requesting an administrative re-
view includes, among other entities, a foreign exporter, a U.S. importer,
or a U.S. domestic petitioner.214
The purpose of the administrative review is to determine the actual
or exact dumping margin in order to carry out the "final computation"
of antidumping duties.215 In conducting the first administrative review,
Commerce usually examines entries of the subject merchandise made
during the twelve-to-eighteen-month period between the date of the ini-
tial suspension of liquidation (Le., the Commerce affirmative preliminary
determination) and the month preceding the one-year anniversary of the
publication date of the antidumping duty order.216 Subsequent adminis-
trative reviews usually cover twelve-month periods.217
Commerce's final results of administrative review establish the ac-
tual or exact amount by which the foreign market value of the subject
merchandise exceeds its U.S. price (Le., the actual dumping margin).218
Upon publication of the final results in the Federal Register, Commerce
directs Customs to assess or compute final antidumping duties in the
amount of the actual dumping margin for those unliquidated entries
211 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(c) (1990); 19 C.F.RIL § 353.18(b) (1989).
212 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(dXl) (1990).
213 19 U.S.C. § 1675(aXl) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.22(a) (1989).
214 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1990). Specifically, the term "interested party" for purposes of request-
ing an administrative review includes a foreign respondent (Le., foreign manufacturer, exporter, or
producer), a U.S. importer, as well as those entities set forth in note 143, supra.
215 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (1990).
216 Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 21,061 (first antidumping
duty administrative review). If Commerce and the ITC were to render affirmative final determina-
tions with respect to critical circumstances in the underlying antidumping duty investigation, then
Commerce would examine entries of the subject merchandise made during the fifteen-to-twenty-one-
month period beginning 90 days before the publication date of the Commerce affirmative prelimi-
nary determination. See supra note 178.
217 Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 39,186 (1990) (second an-
tidumping duty administrative review).
218 19 U.S.C. § 16 75(aX2) (1990).
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made during the twelve-to-eighteen-month period discussed above.2 1 9
For each entry of the subject merchandise made on or after the publica-
tion date of the final results of the administrative review, Commerce also
instructs Customs to collect a cash deposit of estimated duties in the
amount of the rate calculated in the final results.220
If the amount of actual antidumping duties owed by the U.S. im-
porter to Customs is greater or less than the amount of estimated duties
previously deposited with Customs before the publication date of the an-
tidumping duty order, then no interest accrues on any underpayment or
overpayment of estimated duties.'21 If, however, the amount of actual
antidumping duties owed by the U.S. importer is greater than the
amount of estimated duties previously deposited with Customs on or af-
ter the publication date of the order, then the U.S. importer must pay
interest, in addition to actual duties owed, to Customs.222
If the amount of actual antidumping duties owed by the U.S. im-
porter is less than the amount of estimated duties previously deposited
with Customs on or after the publication date of the order, then Com-
merce must direct Customs to refund the difference, together with inter-
est, to the U.S. importer. 2 3  Commerce regulations prohibit a foreign
manufacturer or exporter from reimbursing the U.S. importer for any
antidumping duties paid to Customs.
224
G. Right To Contest Final Determinations: Judicial Review
A "party to the proceeding"''22 may contest in the U.S. Court of
219 See id.; Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at 21,061 (first an-
tidumping duty administrative review). The GATT prohibits the United States from either collect-
ing or assessing both antidumping duties and countervailing duties on the same subject merchandise.
Specifically, the GATT provides that "[n]o product of the territory of any contracting party im-
ported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both antidumping and
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization."
GATT, supra note 2, art. VI, para. 5. To comply with U.S. international obligations pursuant to the
GATT, Commerce makes certain adjustments when an imported product is subject to both kinds of
orders. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(D) (1990); see also Final Determination of Sales At Less Than
Fair Value" Portland Hydraulic Cement and Clinker From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg.29,244 (1990).
220 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1990); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. at
21,061 (first antidumping administrative review).
221 19 U.S.C. § 1677g (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.24 (1989).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 19 C.F.R. § 353.26 (1989).
225 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(o) (1989). A "party to the proceeding" includes any "interested party," as
described in note 143, supra, in addition to a foreign exporter or U.S. importer of the subject mer-
chandise, that "actively participates, through written submissions of factual information or written
argument," in the initial investigation or subsequent administrative review. 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(o)
(1989).
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International Trade (the "CIT") the factual findings, as well as the legal
conclusions, that form the basis of the Commerce or ITCfinal determi-
nations rendered during the original investigation." 6 For example, after
Commerce had rendered its final determination in the antidumping duty
investigation involving Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico,
both Mexican respondents filed suit in the CIT.227 These respondents
challenged, among other things, the exchange rate selected by Commerce
in the underlying investigation to convert Mexican pesos into U.S. dol-
lars.22 A judicial decision in favor of the Mexican respondents could
result in the complete revocation of the antidumping duty order with
respect to one of the Mexican respondents.229
A "party to the proceeding" also may challenge a subsequent ad-
ministrative review issued by Commerce.230 Regardless of whether a
party is challenging an initial Commerce or ITC investigation or a subse-
quent Commerce administrative review, only those determinations that
arefinal - that is, determinations that cannot be changed at the admin-
istrative level - are entitled to judicial review.231' A party that is dissat-
isfied with a decision issued by the CIT may appeal that adverse decision
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the "Federal
Circuit"). 2 3 2
H. Revocation Of Outstanding Antidumping Duty Orders
An antidumping duty order remains in force as long as the foreign
exporter in question continues to sell the subject merchandise in the
United States at less than foreign market value, and such sales continue
to be a cause of material injury, or threaten material injury, to a U.S.
domestic industry.23 3 The foreign exporter, however, has the opportu-
nity through the administrative review process described above to revise
its prices in order to eliminate dumping in the U.S. market.
226 See id.
227 CINSA and Troquelesy Esmaltes Complaint at 132 CL No. 87-01-00220 (January 30, 1987).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(BXiii) (1990).
231 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(aX1),(2)(B) (1990). The Tariff Act considers the following determinations
to be final for purposes of judicial review: (1) a determination by Commerce not to initiate an
antidumping duty investigation; (2) a negative preliminary determination rendered by the ITC; (3)
final determinations rendered by the ITC or Commerce; (4) a scope determination issued by Com-
merce; or (5) a final results of an administrative review. Id. To obtain judicial review, a "party to the
proceeding" must file a summons with the CIT within 30 days after the date of publication in the
Federal Register of a notice of a final determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A) (1990).
232 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(cXl), 1295(aX5) (1990).
233 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1990); 19 C.F.1L § 353.25 (1989).
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If the foreign exporter has eliminated dumping, it can request Com-
merce to revoke, in whole or in part, the outstanding antidumping duty
order.23 4 Commerce may revoke an outstanding order, in whole or in
part, if all the "producers and resellers" covered by the order have satis-
fied the following two conditions: (1) they have discontinued making
sales of the subject merchandise at less than foreign market value "for a
period of at least three consecutive years; ' 23 5 and (2) "it is not likely that
these persons will, in the future, sell the merchandise" at less than for-
eign market value.236
Commerce also may revoke an antidumping order, in whole or in
part, because of "changed circumstances." 23 7 The party seeking revoca-
tion of an antidumping duty order based upon "changed circumstances"
bears the burden of persuasion regarding whether there exist circum-
stances sufficient to warrant the revocation of the order.238 One example
of "changed circumstances" is that the subject merchandise covered by
the antidumping duty order no longer is a cause of, or threatens to cause,
material injury to a U.S. domestic industry. 9 Another example is that
the U.S. domestic industry is no longer interested in maintaining the an-
tidumping duty order.240
I. Conclusion
Title VII, section 731, of the Tariff Act provides for the imposition
of antidumping duties only when imports of the subject merchandise are
sold at less than fair value in the United States, and such imports are a
cause of, or threaten to cause, material injury to the relevant U.S. domes-
tic industry. Selling at less than fair value generally refers to the practice
of charging a higher price for the merchandise sold in the foreign ex-
porter's home market or a third-country market (Le., foreign market
value) than the price charged for comparable merchandise sold in the
U.S. market (Le., U.S. price).
234 19 C.F.R. § 353.25 (1989).
235 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.25 (1989).
236 Id.
237 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b),(c) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d) (1989).
238 See id.
239 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1990); 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(dX)(Iii) (1989).
240 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(dX1)(i) (1989). Commerce will revoke an outstanding antidumping duty
order, in whole or in part, if it receives an "affirmative statement of no interest from the petitioner."
19 C.F.R. § 353.25(dX2) (1989). Commerce will presume a lack of interest in maintaining the an-
tidumping order when no "interested party" requests an administrative review for a period of five
consecutive years. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(dX4)(i) (1989). Commerce will revoke an order under such
circumstances unless an "interested party" objects in writing to the revocation. 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.25(d)(4)(iii) (1989).
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Both Commerce and the ITC must render affirmative final determi-
nations before Commerce acquires the legal authority pursuant to the
Tariff Act to publish an antidumping duty order that triggers the imposi-
tion or assessment of antidumping duties. Certain Mexican exporters
found in the past to be dumping have been able to avoid the imposition of
such duties by convincing the ITC that their merchandise was not a
cause of, or did not threaten to cause, material injury to the relevant U.S.
domestic industry.
Despite these favorable determinations, Mexican exporters recently
have found themselves involved in a growing number of complex U.S.
antidumping duty proceedings. These exporters, like other foreign ex-
porters, have discovered that a working knowledge of the statutory and
regulatory procedures and requirements of the U.S. antidumping duty
law is essential for continued commercial success in the U.S. market.
For this reason, the current administration of the U.S. antidumping duty
law vis-a-vis Mexican exporters should play one of the leading roles in
future U.S.-Mexico free trade talks.
Application of Commerce's general and special rules for currency
conversion, the feasibility of quantitative restriction agreements and their
implications under the GATT - as well as the ITC's injury standard
and its concomitant authority to define the relevant U.S. domestic indus-
try on a regional basis - should be just a few of the many technical
antidumping issues that dominate future U.S.-Mexico free trade negotia-
tions. If the U.S.-Canada experience can serve as a model for future
U.S.-Mexico trade relations, then U.S. and Mexican trade negotiators
and administrators may be grappling with antidumping issues even after
a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement is in place.
III. CURRENT ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAWS IN PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING PRODUCTS FROM
MEXaco
A. Introduction
Until recently, U.S. countervailing duty actions comprised the ma-
jority of U.S. unfair trade proceedings involving imports of Mexican ori-
gin. Although the number of countervailing duty actions covering
Mexican products has declined during the past few years, while the
number of antidumping actions has increased, certain countervailing
duty issues continue to have a significant commercial impact upon the
daily business activities of many Mexican exporters. Some of these is-
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sues, which already have spawned several lawsuits in U.S. courts, should
also play a significant role in forthcoming U.S.-Mexico free trade talks.
This section of the Article first chronicles the historical origins of
the international obligation recently undertaken by the United States to
grant Mexican products an injury test in countervailing duty proceed-
ings. In particular, this section analyzes the legal consequences and dis-
cusses the lawsuits arising out of Mexico's entering into a bilateral
agreement with the United States in 1985 and acceding to the GATT one
year later. This section then examines a novel administrative procedure
currently employed by the United States to grant certain duty-free im-
ports of Mexican origin an injury test, discusses certain aspects of the
1985 U.S.-Mexico bilateral trade accord, and concludes by exploring one
of the more controversial issues arising under the U.S. countervailing
duty law today - namely, the so-called "de facto specificity test".
B. The Injury Test Requirement In U.S. Countervailing Duty
Actions Involving Dutiable And Duty-Free Products From
Mexico
1. Historical Origins Of The Injury Test Requirement Pursuant To
The GATT And The U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws
GAIT contracting parties typically initiate countervailing duty pro-
ceedings to counteract the trade distorting effects of subsidies. A subsidy
is generally the bestowal of goods or services by a government upon the
manufacture, production, or exportation of a product on terms that are
preferential or inconsistent with commercial considerations.241
Article VI of the GAT 2 4 2 and the GATT Subsidies Code24 3 au-
thorize signatory countries to impose countervailing duties, in addition
to customs duties, upon subsidized products that cause or threaten mate-
rial injury to, or materially retard the establishment of, a domestic indus-
try. Neither the GATT nor the GATT Subsidies Code currently
authorizes signatory countries to impose countervailing duties upon
244
The United States currently administers two countervailing duty
laws to offset any unfair benefits that foreign exporters might enjoy over
U.S. producers in the U.S. market as a result of receiving subsidies from
241 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(5), 1303(a)(1) (1990).
242 GATr, art. VI, para. 6(a).
243 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures), MTN/NTM/
W/236, reprinted in House Doe. No. 98-153, pt I at 257 (hereinafter "GATT Subsidies Code").
244 See supra notes 241 and 242; see also supra note 19.
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their foreign governments. 245 Section 303 of the Tariff Act implements
U.S. international obligations arising under the GATT.2' Title VII, sec-
tion 701, of the Tariff Act implements U.S. international obligations aris-
ing under the GATT Subsidies Code.24 7
As previously discussed, the GATT authorizes contracting parties
to impose countervailing duties only if the subsidized merchandise is
causing, or threatening to cause, material injury to a domestic indus-
try.24' Article VI, paragraph 6(a), of the GATT provides in relevant
part:
No contracting party shall levy any ... countervailing duty on the
importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party
unless it determines that the effect of the... subsidization ... is such as to
cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is
such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry.2 49
Even though the United States acceded to the GATT in 1947,250
Article VI of the GATT did not require the United States to conduct an
injury investigation in U.S. countervailing duty proceedings until
1974.25 t In other words, the GATT essentially authorized the United
States for more than two decades to impose countervailing duties in the
absence of an affirmative injury determination. The reason for this ap-
parent anomaly stems from the Protocol of Provisional Application of
the GATT (the "GATT Protocol"), the legal instrument pursuant to
which the United States acceded to the GATT.25 2
The relevant language of the GATT Protocol required certain signa-
tory countries, including the United States, to apply certain provisions of
the GATT, including Article VI, "to the fullest extent not inconsistent
with existing legislation." '253 The U.S. countervailing duty law in effect
at the time that the United States acceded to the GATT - section 303 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 - covered only dutiable merchandise and did not
require an affirmative injury determination to trigger the imposition of
245 Overview of U.S. Trade Statutes at 45. The United States imposes countervailing duties equal
to the amount of the "net subsidy" conferred upon the subject merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)
(1990). For a definition of the term "net subsidy," see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1990).
246 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1990).
247 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 et seq. (1990).
248 See supra note 242.
249 See id.
250 See supra note 2.
251 S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 185, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 7186, 7320; Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 335, 344 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), aff'd, Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 879 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
252 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947).
253 Id.
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countervailing duties.25 4  The GATT Protocol, therefore,
"grandfathered" under the GATT existing U.S. legislation that, on its
face, was inconsistent with Article VI of the GATT.2"'
In 1974, Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1974 which, among
other things, amended section 303 of the Tariff Act.256 In exchange for
granting certain imports from certain Lesser Developed Countries
("LDCs") duty-free treatment pursuant to the U.S. Generalized System
of Preferences ("GSP"), the Trade Act of 1974 expanded the purview of
the U.S. countervailing duty law to cover duty-free merchandise.2 7 Be-
cause Congress enacted this amendment well after the formation of the
GATT, the provision for duty-free merchandise fell outside the GAIT
"grandfather" clause.2"' Accordingly, Article VI of the GATT required
the United States for the first time to conduct an injury investigation in a
countervailing duty proceeding. 259
This requirement to grant an injury test applied only to duty-free
merchandise, however, and only when the "international obligations of
the United States" mandated the application of such a test.26 The term
"international obligations," as appearing in section 303(a)(2) of the Tariff
Act, refers to the GATT or any bilateral agreement pursuant to which
the United States has pledged to grant another country most favored na-
tion treatment. 261 Thus, only duty-free imports from GATT signatory
countries, or countries that have entered into a bilateral agreement de-
scribed above, are entitled to an injury test pursuant to section 303(a)(2)
of the Tariff Act.262
At the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions that took place during the mid-to-late 1970s, the United States, to-
gether with several other GATT signatory countries, became a signatory
to the GATT Subsidies Code.263 The Subsidies Code, a subsidiary agree-
ment to the GATT, established for the first time on a multilateral basis
specific rules and procedures designed to counteract the trade distorting
effects of export subsidies.216
254 46 Stat. 687.
255 See supra note 251.
256 See id.; Pub. L. 93-618, Title III, section 331(a), 88 Stat. 2049.
257 See id.
258 See supra note 251.
259 See id.
260 See id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1990).
261 See supra note 251.
262 See id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1990).
263 Overview of U.S. Trade Statutes at 46.
264 Id. at 46-47.
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To implement the United States' international obligations arising
under the GATT Subsidies Code, the U.S. Congress passed the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (the "Trade Agreements Act") and, thereby,
enacted a new U.S. countervailing duty law.26 In so doing, the U.S.
Congress did not repeal the U.S. countervailing duty law in effect at that
time, section 303 of the Tariff Act.266 The two countervailing duty stat-
utes have coexisted since 1980.
The new U.S. countervailing duty law, which appears in Title VII,
section 701, of the Tariff Act, requires the United States to conduct an
injury investigation for both duty-free and dutiable imports in a counter-
vailing duty proceeding.267 Before the United States grants an injury test
pursuant to Title VII, however, the foreign country from which the im-
ports originated first must acquire "country under the Agreement" status
within the meaning of section 701 of the Tariff Act.268
Section 701 offers foreign countries two options to acquire "country
under the Agreement" status. First, the United States can accept the
accession by a foreign country to the GATT Subsidies Code. 6 9 Second,
a foreign country can enter into a bilateral agreement with the United
States.2 70 Pursuant to such an agreement, the foreign sovereign must
pledge to assume obligations vis-a-vis the United States that are "substan-
tially equivalent" to the international obligations arising under the
GATT Subsidies Code.271
If a particular foreign country acquires "country under the Agree-
ment" status, then section 701 of the Tariff Act is the governing counter-
vailing duty statute in the event of a countervailing duty investigation.272
If, however, a foreign country does not acquire "country under the
Agreement" status, then section 303 of the Tariff Act is the controlling
countervailing duty law. 3 The principal difference between these coun-
tervailing duty laws is that section 303 does not authorize the United
States to conduct an injury investigation for dutiable imports.27 4
Mexico decided to acquire "country under the Agreement" status
by entering into a bilateral agreement with the United States. In 1985,
265 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, Title I, § 101, 93 Stat. 151.
266 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1990).
267 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1990).
268 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1990).
269 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(1) (1990).
270 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b)(2) (1990).
271 Id.
272 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1990).
273 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1990).
274 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1303(aX2) (1990) with 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1990).
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the United States and Mexico signed the "Understanding Between the
United States and Mexico Regarding Subsidies and Countervailing Du-
ties" (the "Understanding").2 75 Pursuant to the Understanding, Mexico
assumed obligations "substantially equivalent" to those arising under the
GAIT Subsidies Code.2 76 Accordingly, dutiable and duty-free imports
of Mexican origin became entitled to an injury test in U.S. countervailing
duty investigations pursuant to section 701 of the Tariff Act.2 77
The Understanding, at paragraph 5, requires the United States to
grant an injury test in all prospective countervailing duty investigations
involving Mexican products, as well as in countervailing duty investiga-
tions that were already "in progress" when Mexico and the United States
entered into the bilateral accord.27 8 Paragraph 5 of the Understanding
provides in relevant part:
With respect to all United States countervailing duty investigations in pro-
gress concerning products of Mexico as of the date of entry into force of this
Understanding, the United States shall ensure that no countervailing duties
shall be imposed upon any product of Mexico unless it is determined that
the subsidized imports are, through the effects of the subsidy, causing or
threatening to cause material injury to an established domestic industry, or
retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry.2 79
In Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, the People's Republic
of China, and Taiwan, the first U.S. countervailing duty investigation
initiated against Mexican imports after Mexico had entered into the Un-
derstanding, the ITC granted Mexican products an injury test for the
first time in a U.S. countervailing duty proceeding.
280
On August 24, 1986, one year after Mexico had entered into the
Understanding, Mexico acceded to the GATT.2 8 1 This event similarly
entitled certain Mexican imports to an injury test in U.S. countervailing
duty actions. Specifically, duty-free imports of Mexican origin became
entitled to an injury test pursuant to section 303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act
and Article VI of the GATT.
282
Although the relevant language appearing in the Tariff Act, the Un-
derstanding, and the GATT demonstrates that Mexican imports in gen-
eral became entitled to an injury determination in U.S. countervailing
duty proceedings, an issue arose concerning the effective date of this U.S.
275 See supra note 1.
276 See supra note 1, at paras. 1 and 2.
277 See id. at para. 5; 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a),(b)(2) (1990).
278 See supra note 1, at para. 5.
279 Id. (emphasis added).
280 See supra note 136.
281 See supra note 2.
282 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1990); GATT, art. VI, para. 6(a).
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obligation. This issue ignited intense controversy in both the United
States and Mexico and resulted in the filing of several legal actions in
U.S. courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.2 3
2. Judicial Resolution Of The Injury Test Obligation Arising Under
the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Understanding And The GAIT
The legal challenges concerning the effective date of the injury test
obligation arising under the U.S.-Mexico bilateral Understanding and the
GATT find their genesis in the initial countervailing duty investigation of
Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico.2zs In that
investigation, Commerce found that the Government of Mexico had be-
stowed countervailable subsidies upon Mexican producers and exporters
of portland hydraulic cement .2 5 Because, at the time of the nitial inves-
tigation, Mexico had not acquired "country under the Agreement" status
and had not acceded to the GATT, the ITC did not conduct an injury
investigation.2 6 Accordingly, Commerce published both its affirmative
final determination and the countervailing duty order in the Federal Reg-
ister on September 21, 1983.287
In December 1985, after Mexico had signed the Understanding and
acquired "country under the Agreement" status, Commerce completed
the first administrative review of the countervailing duty order covering
Mexican cement. 2 8 This administrative review covered imports of the
subject merchandise entered into the United States during the period
July 1, 1983 - December 31, 1983.289 Because Mexico had not acquired
"country under the Agreement" status until after the investigation and
publication of the countervailing duty order, Commerce concluded that
an injury determination, pursuant to the Tariff Act and the Understand-
ing, was not warranted in the first administrative review.2 9o
In December, 1986, after Mexico had acceded to the GATT, Com-
merce completed the second administrative review covering the subject
merchandise.291 This administrative review covered imports entered
283 110 S.Ct. 1318 (1990).
284 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, Portland
Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker From Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (1983).
285 Id.
286 Id. at 43,064.
287 Id.
288 Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker From Mexico; Final Results ofAdministrative
Review of Countervailing Duty Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,732 (Dec. 19, 1985).
289 Id.
290 See id.
291 Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker From Mexico; Final Results of Counter-
vailing Duty Administrative Review, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,500 (1986).
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during the period January 1, 1984 - December 31, 1984.292 Although
imports of Mexican cement entered into the United States duty free dur-
ing the administrative review period, all of these entries had occurred
before Mexico acceded to the GATT.2 93 Accordingly, Commerce rea-
soned that an injury determination, pursuant to section 303(a)(2) of the
Tariff Act and Article VI of the GATT, was not warranted in the second
administrative review either.294
Mexican producers and exporters of portland hydraulic cement
challenged both of these administrative determinations by filing three
separate lawsuits in the CIT. In the lawsuit challenging the first adminis-
trative review, Cementos Anahuac Del Golfo, S.A. v. U.S. ("Cementos
Anahuac P'), the Mexican litigants contended that the Understanding
proscribed the United States from continuing to impose countervailing
duties upon Mexican cement in the absence of an affirmative injury deter-
mination.295 The Mexican plaintiffs further contended that because the
ITC had not rendered such a determination in the initial countervailing
duty investigation, Commerce should revoke the outstanding counter-
vailing duty order.296
To support their contentions, the Mexican exporters argued that the
phrase "investigations in progress," as appearing in paragraph 5 of the
Understanding, warranted a broad construction.297 Specifically, the
Mexican plaintiffs contended that this language encompassed all phases
of an administrative proceeding, including an administrative review.298
Because the first administrative review covering Mexican cement was al-
ready "in progress" when Mexico entered into the Understanding, para-
graph 5 of the Understanding, in conjunction with sections 701 and
303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act, prohibited the further imposition of counter-
vailing duties in the absence of an affirmative injury determination.2 99
By contrast, the United States contended that the plain language of
the Understanding, at paragraph 5, requires an injury investigation in
only two situations: (1) where a countervailing duty "investigation,"
rather than an administrative review, was already "in progress" when
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Cementos Anahuac del Golfo, S.A. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1558, 1566 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988); rev'd, Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 879 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1989); cert. de-
nied, 110 S.Ct. 1318 (1990).
296 687 F. Supp. at 1559, 1566.
297 687 F. Supp. at 1566 (R. Doc. 60).
298 Id.
299 Id. at 1565-1566.
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Mexico signed the Understanding; and (2) where a countervailing duty
"investigation" is initiated after Mexico became a signatory to the bilat-
eral accord.3 o In other words, if a countervailing duty order covering
Mexican imports was already in effect as of the date that the parties en-
tered into the Understanding, then none of the imports subject to that
order (Le., imports subject to a prospective administrative review) would
be entitled to an injury test.30 1
To support its contention, the United States directed the court's at-
tention in Cementos Anahuac I to the Commerce regulations in effect
during the period in which the United States and Mexico entered into the
Understanding, as well as the period covered by the first administrative
review.30 2 The relevant regulation defined the term "investigation" to
include only that judicially reviewable segment of the administrative pro-
ceeding that takes place before, among other events, the publication of an
order.30 3 In other words, the term "investigation," as defined by the
Commerce regulations in effect at that time, did not encompass an ad-
ministrative review.
The United States then proceeded to argue that because identical
terms used in similar, if not identical, contexts should have the same
meaning, the term "investigations," as appearing in paragraph 5 of the
Understanding, did not encompass an administrative review either.30 5
Therefore, neither the Understanding nor the Tariff Act, according to the
United States, required an injury determination in the first countervailing
duty administrative review covering cement imported from Mexico. 6
Despite this argument, the CIT rejected the interpretation advanced
by the U.S. Government in Cementos Anahuac I and ruled in favor of the
Mexican exporters.30 7 The court's opinion states in relevant part:
Here, Mexico met the standard(s) of section 701(b) before any counter-
vailing duties were sought to be imposed on entries for the period at issue,
July 1-December 31, 1983. The change in [Mexico's] status [under section
701], as the country of origin, altered the status of the merchandise emanat-
ing therefrom insofar as imposition of those duties was concerned.30 8
300 Id. at 1563-1564.
301 Id.
302 Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 353.6(b) (1985); Cf. 19 C.F.R. § 353.11(b) (1985) (definition of antidumping
proceeding).
303 Id.
304 See id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 687 F. Supp. at 1569.
308 Id. at 1562.
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As a result, the CIT remanded the matter to Commerce.3 0°9
In the lawsuits challenging the second administrative review de-
scribed above, Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. U.S. and Cementos Ana-
huac Del Golfo, S.A. v. U.S. C'Cementos Anahuac I1"), Mexican
exporters of the subject merchandise once again sought revocation of the
outstanding countervailing duty order.310 In these lawsuits, the Mexican
plaintiffs marshalled essentially the same arguments that they had ad-
vanced in Cementos Anahuac I with regard to the Understanding.311
Furthermore, the Mexican exporters advanced an alternative argu-
ment. The Mexican litigants contended that Mexican imports of cement,
a duty-free product pursuant to U.S. law, were entitled to an injury test
pursuant to section 303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act and Article VI of the
GATT.312 The Mexican plaintiffs emphasized that by the time Com-
merce completed the second administrative review of the subject mer-
chandise, Mexico already had acceded to the GATT:
[S]ince the date of Mexico's GATT accession in 1986, Mexico has become
entitled to all the privileges of GATT membership. This, of course, in-
cludes that its products not be subject to the imposition of countervailing
duties where there has been no related injury determination by the ITC.
After GATT accession or other qualifying action, [Commerce] is without
authority to issue any order directing the Customs to impose final counter-
vailing duties and liquidate entries absent an affirmative injury requirement.
The fact that the entries in question were made prior to GATT accession is
not dispositive; the fact the order directing imposition or final liquidation of
provisional duties collected on those entries was issued after GATT acces-
sion is.313
The United States contended, in accordance with a well settled prin-
ciple of U.S. customs law, that liability for duties, including counter-
vailing duties, attaches at the time of entry of the imported merchandise
into the customs territory of the United States.314 Because the entries at
issue had occurred before Mexico acceded to the GATT, plaintiffs' argu-
ment, according to the United States, necessarily would give Mexico's
newly acquired GATT privileges retroactive effect. 315
The United States further contended that this result would conflict
309 Id. at 1569.
310 Cementos Guadalajara, 686 F. Supp. at 336, 337; CementosAnahauc Del Golfo, S.A. v. United
States, 689 F. Supp. at 1192, 1193, aff'd, 879 F.2d at 847; cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. at 1318.
311 686 F. Supp. at 342-353; 689 F. Supp. at 1205-1214.
312 Id.
313 686 F. Supp. at 348-349 (citations omitted)(emphasis supplied in original).
314 Id. at 351-352.
315 Id.
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with a well established principle of statutory and treaty construction. 16
This principle provides that, absent a contrary intent manifested by Con-
gress or the international agreement in question, international agree-
ments, such as the GATT, have only prospective, rather than retroactive,
effect.317
The United States then parried the plaintiffs' arguments concerning
the Understanding by stressing that plaintiffs were attempting to apply
the terms of the Understanding retroactively as well.318 The United
States also reiterated its earlier argument from Cementos Anahuac I that
the term "investigations," as appearing in paragraph 5 of the Under-
standing, did not encompass an administrative review.319
In two separate opinions written by a different judge of the CIT, the
court ruled against the Mexican exporters in Cementos Guadalajara and
Cementos Anahuac 11.320 In disagreeing sub silentio with the reasoning
of Cementos Anahuac I, Judge Carman endorsed all of the arguments
advanced by the U.S. Government concerning the Understanding and
the GATT.
In particular, the court agreed with the U.S. Government's interpre-
tation of the term "investigations," as appearing in paragraph 5 of the
Understanding. 32 1 The CIT emphasized that, just as the term "investiga-
tion," as defined by the Commerce regulations in effect during the rele-
vant period, does not encompass an administrative review, so the
identical term appearing in the Understanding does "not include reviews
as plaintiff has argued. ' 32
Furthermore, the CIT fully agreed with the U.S. position that plain-
tiffs' legal theory would result in the improper, retroactive application of
paragraph 5 of the Understanding and Article VI of the GATT.323 Un-
derscoring that "the liability for [countervailing] duties is established at
the time of entry of the goods into the United States, '324 Judge Carman
explained:
The [terms of the] Understanding did not provide for retroactive applica-
316 See generally 689 F. Supp. at 1212-1214.
317 See id.
318 689 F. Supp. at 1209-1214.
319 Id.
320 686 F. Supp. at 353; 689 F. Supp. at 1216.
321 689 F. Supp. at 1210-1211.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 1213-1214.
324 686 F. Supp. at 351, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1981), rev'd and rem'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983), rev'd and rem'd
on other grounds, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 823 F.2d 518 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
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tion of an injury determination prior to the effective date of the
Understanding.
The Court further holds the determinations by [Commerce] not to
treat [the subject merchandise] entered in 1984 as effectively retroactive on
account of the accession of Mexico to the GATT on August 24, 1986 was
supported by substantial evidence on the record and was otherwise in ac-
cordance with law. There is no provision in U.S. domestic countervailing
duty law or in the GATTproviding for retroactive effect. 325
Judge Carman subsequently affirmed the second administrative review
issued by Commerce and, accordingly, denied the plaintiffs' request for
revocation of the outstanding countervailing duty order.326
All of the parties involved in the three lawsuits before the CIT ap-
pealed the conflicting final judgments to the Federal Circuit. The Fed-
eral Circuit consolidated all of the appeals and, in a per curiam opinion
issued in Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. US, ruled in favor of the U.S.
Government.327 In so doing, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT's deci-
sion in Cementos Anahuac I and affirmed both of Judge Carman's deci-
3281 h Uiesions. The United States Supreme Court then denied the Mexican
exporters' subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari and, thereby, con-
clusively settled the legal disputes arising from the three lawsuits.329
As the dust settles on these judicial decisions, a few general princi-
ples emerge that may guide Mexican exporters and U.S. importers during
the immediate future. Dutiable and duty-free imports of Mexican origin
that are subject to an outstanding countervailing duty order that was in
effect as of April 23, 1985, the effective date of the Understanding, are
not entitled to an injury test pursuant to section 701 of the Tariff Act and
paragraph 5 of the Understanding. Duty-free imports of Mexican origin
that entered into the customs territory of the United States before Au-
gust 24, 1986, the date that Mexico acceded to the GATT, similarly are
not entitled to an injury test pursuant to the Tariff Act and the GATT.
As discussed in the next subsection, however, duty-free imports of Mexi-
can origin that entered into the United States on or after August 24,
1986, are entitled without qualification to an injury test pursuant to U.S.
law.
325 689 F. Supp. at 1213-1214 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
326 686 F. Supp. at 353; 689 F. Supp. at 1216.
327 Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 879 F.2d 847 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
328 Id.
329 110 S.Ct. at 1318.
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3. Mexico's Entitlement To An Injury Test For Post-GA7T Accession
Entries Of Duty-Free Merchandise
Duty-free imports of Mexican origin that entered into the customs
territory of the United States on or after the date that Mexico acceded to
the GATT are entitled to an injury determination pursuant to section
303(a)(2) of Tariff Act and Article VI of the GATT.33 0 These duty-free
imports, as opposed to dutiable imports, are entitled to an injury test
even if they are subject to an outstanding countervailing duty order that
was in effect as of that date. 31 In other words, the United States must
conduct an injury investigation for such duty-free imports even during
the administrative review stage of a countervailing duty proceeding.
These legal conclusions follow from a careful analysis of section 303
of the Tariff Act and Article VI of the GATT. Section 303(a)(2) of the
Tariff Act proscribes, in the absence of an affirmative injury determina-
tion, the imposition of countervailing duties upon duty-free imports from
GATT contracting parties that have not signed, or assumed obligations
"substantially equivalent" to, the GATT Subsidies Code.332  Section
303(a)(2) provides in relevant part:
In the case of any imported article or merchandise which is free of duty,
duties may be imposed under this section only if there are affirmative [in-
jury] determinations by the Commission... except that such a determina-
tion shall not be required unless... required by the international obligations
of the United States.333
Mexico's entitlement to an injury test pursuant to section 303(a)(2) turns
upon the meaning of the term "imposed," as underscored above, and the
nature of the "international [GATT] obligations" codified into that stat-
utory provision.
Although the Tariff Act does not define the operative term "im-
posed," the relevant legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended this term to have the same meaning as the term "levy," as
appearing in the relevant provisions of the GATT.334 The term "levy,"
330 19 U.S.C. § 1303(aX2) (1990); GATT, art. VI, para. 6(a); Lime From Mexico, FinalResults of
Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Revocation of Countervailing
Duty Order, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,324, 49,325-49,329 (1989); 54 Fed. Reg. 51,340-51,341 (1989).
331 Id.
332 Id.; S. Rep. No. 1298, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 185, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 7186, 7320.
333 19 U.S.C. § 1303(aX2) (1990) (emphasis added).
334 The Senate report accompanying section 303(aX2) of the Tariff Act, which expanded the
purview of the U.S. countervailing duty law to cover duty-free merchandise, provides in relevant
part:
The inclusion of an injury standard [in section 303(aX2) of the Tariff Act] is appropriate in light
of the general countervailing duty rule in Article VI of the GATT which requires a finding of
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as appearing in Article VI of the GATT, refers to the final legal assess-
ment or collection of a countervailing duty.33 5 Therefore, Congress in-
tended the term "imposed," as appearing in section 303(a)(2) of the
Tariff Act, to refer to the final legal assessment or collection of a counter-
vailing duty.336 This legal conclusion is consistent not only with U.S.
customs law337 but also with the CIT's decision in Serampore Industries
Pvt Ltd. v. Commerce Department.338
Additionally, Article VI of the GATT, by requiring contracting par-
ties to conduct an injury investigation before "levy[ingJ any... counter-
injury before such duties may be levied on subsidized product imports. Section 303 of the 1930
Tariff Act does not [currently] provide for an injury test. However, because the present U.S.
countervailing duty law, which applies only to dutiable items, predates the GATT, it is within
the permitted exceptions to the GATT under the so-called "grandfather clause." However, the
[current] extension of such law to nondutiable items is not covered by any such exception and
so the nondutiable items should be subject to an injury test.
S. Rep. No. 128, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 185 (emphasis added).
This language demonstrates that Congress intended the term "imposed," as appearing in section
303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act, to have the same meaning as the term "levy," as appearing in Article VI
of the GATT. Furthermore, although not dispositive of the issue, the title of section 303 of the
Tariff Act - "Levy of countervailing duties" - supports this conclusion. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1990).
335 Paragraph 6(a) of Article VI of the GAT provides that "[n]o contracting party shall levy any
.. countervailing duty" upon imports from another contracting party in the absence of an affirma-
tive injury determination. GAIT, art. VI, para. 6(aXemphasis added). Although the GATT does
not define the term "levy," the GATT Subsidies Code defines that term to refer to "the definitive or
final legal assessment or collection of a duty or tax." GAIT Subsidies Code, art. 4, n. 14. Because
the GAIT Subsidies Code is an interpretative agreement of the GAIT, it is reasonable to conclude
that the term "levy," as appearing in Article VI of the GATT, has the same meaning as the identical
term in Article 4 of the GATT Subsidies Code.
In fact, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties (the "Vienna Conven-
tion") compels this conclusion. Article 31 provides in relevant part that "[a]ny subsequent agree-
ment between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions
... shall be taken into account" when interpreting the terms of "the treaty." Vien. Cony., art 31,
para. 3(a)(emphasis added). The GAIT Subsidies Code constitutes such a "subsequent agreement"
within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The official name or title of the GATT
Subsidies Code is the "Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." See supra note 243. Furthermore, just as "[it is
true that the views of a subsequent [U.S.] Congress... are entitled to some weight, particularly
when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure," Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United
States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 839 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), so the views of subsequent GATT drafters
should likewise be entitled to some weight. Therefore, the term "levy," as appearing in Article VI of
the GATT, also refers to the "final legal assessment or collection of a duty." GATT Subsidies Code,
art. 4, n.14.
336 See supra notes 334, 335.
337 See supra note 175.
338 675 F. Supp. 1354 (CL Int'l Trade 1987). In Serampore, the CIT endorsed Commerce's inter-
pretation of the term "imposed," as appearing in the phrase "the amount of any countervailing duty
imposed," contained in section 772 of the Tariff Act. Id. Commerce interpreted the operative term
to refer to the final legal assessment of a countervailing duty. Id. It is a well settled canon of
statutory construction that identical terms in the same statute have the same meaning. Sutherland
Stat. Const. § 51.01 - .03 (4th Ed. 1984).
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vailing dut[ies],"'339 necessarily requires such parties to render an injury
determination each time they seek to assess or collect duties pursuant to
an outstanding order.340 In other words, this international obligation to
grant an injury test does not terminate with the issuance of a counter-
vailing duty order, but continues for the life of the order. As explained
by Commerce in the final results of the "changed circumstances" admin-
istrative review involving Lime from Mexico:
The GATT has always recognized that a contracting party has a continuing
obligation to review and update the original determinations that resulted in
the countervailing duty order; the issuance of an order does not establish a
basis for collecting [or assessing] duties indefinitely.341
Because Congress intended the operative term "imposed," as ap-
pearing in section 303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act, to refer to the final legal
assessment or collection of a countervailing duty, and because Congress
codified all of the Article VI requirements of the GATT into section
303(a)(2), Congress necessarily codified into that statutory provision the
GATT's continuing obligation to grant an injury test throughout the life
of a countervailing duty order.3 42 In other words, Congress intended an
injury investigation for duty-free imports from, among other countries, a
GAT contracting party that has not signed the GATT Subsidies Code
each time Commerce directs Customs, pursuant to section 303 of the
Tariff Act, to assess or collect countervailing duties.343
When Mexico acceded to the GATT on August 24, 1986, duty-free
imports of Mexican origin were subject to ten separate U.S. counter-
vailing duty orders. 3 " In light of the legal analysis presented above, both
Commerce and the Office of the United States Trade Representative con-
cluded that U.S. law proscribed the imposition of countervailing duties
upon such post-GATT accession imports in the absence of an affirmative
339 GATT, art. VI, para. 6(a) (emphasis added).
340 See supra note 330. Specifically, Article VI of the GATT provides that "[n]o contracting
party shall levy any... countervailing duty on the importation of any product... unless it deter-
mines that the effect of the... subsidization... is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an
established domestic industry .... GAIT, art. VI, para. 6(a) (emphasis added). Because the term
"levy" refers to the "final legal assessment or collection of a [countervailing] duty," see supra note
335, Article VI of the GATT necessarily requires contracting parties to conduct an injury investiga-
tion each time the party seeks to "assess" or "collect" countervailing duties pursuant to an outstand-
ing order. See supra note 330.
341 Supra note 330, 54 Fed. Reg. at 49,326.
342 See supra notes 330, 334, 335, 337; 19 U.S.C. 1303(a)(2) (1990).
343 See id.
344 Status Report of Outstanding Countervailing Duty Orders, U.S. Department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration, Import Administration, Office of Countervailing Duty Compli-
ance (Oct. 1990).
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injury determination.345 As a result, the Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration at Commerce requested the ITC to conduct an injury
investigation for such duty-free imports.'
Consistent with its previous legal position in Certain Fasteners From
India ("Indian Fasteners"),347 the ITC responded that the relevant provi-
sions of the Tariff Act did not authorize the Commission to conduct an
injury investigation for such duty-free imports of Mexican origin.348 In
Indian Fasteners, India was a signatory to the GATT when Commerce
conducted the initial countervailing duty investigation.3 49 The merchan-
dise subject to the investigation, however, was dutiable, rather than duty
free, in accordance with U.S. law.350 Accordingly, the subject merchan-
dise in Indian Fasteners was not entitled to an injury determination pur-
suant to section 303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act during the initial
345 Letter From Assistant Secretary for Import Administration to the Chairperson of the ITC
(Oct. 15, 1987); Memorandum to Ambassador Yeutter from USTR General Counsel Alan F.
Holmer (May 28, 1987).
346 Id.
347 47 Fed. Reg. 44,129 (1982); ITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-82-101 (Jan. 25, 1982);
see also ITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-85-010 (Jan. 24, 1985) (identical issue involving
duty-free imports from Trinidad and Tobago).
348 Letter From The Secretary of the ITC to the Assistant Secretary for Import Administration
(Dec. 17, 1987)("Letter From ITC Secretary"). The ITC took the position that section 303(aX2) of
the Tariff Act did not authorize an injury investigation for the duty-free imports of Mexican origin at
issue. Id. The ITC emphasized that the language of the statute did not contemplate an injury
investigation for products already subject to outstanding countervailing duty orders. Id. Similarly,
the ITC interpreted section 751(b) of the Tariff Act literally so as to authorize the Commission only
to "review" a previous injury determination. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1985). Because the ITC had
not conducted a previous injury investigation for any of the duty-free imports of Mexican origin at
issue, the agency reasoned that it lacked the legal authority to conduct an injury "review" pursuant
to section 75 1(b) of the Tariff Act. Letter From ITC Secretary.
The Commission also concluded that section 104(b) of the Trade Agreements Act did not au-
thorize the agency to conduct an injury investigation either. Id. Section 104(b) - which established
the transition rules for granting an injury test to foreign countries that signed, or assumed obliga-
tions "substantially equivalent" to those of, the GATT Subsidies Code - provides in relevant part:
In the case of a countervailing duty order issued under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. 1303)_
(C) which is in effect on January 1, 1980 ... the Commission, upon request of the govern-
ment of such a country or of the exporters accounting for a significant portion of exports to
the United States of merchandise which is covered by the order, submitted [by January 1,
1983] shall make [an injury] determination under paragraph 2 of this subsection.
Pub. L. 96-39, Title I, § 104(b), 93 Stat. 151 (emphasis added).
Mexico did not assume obligations "substantially equivalent" to those of the GATT Subsidies
Code until 1985, when it entered into the Understanding with the United States. See supra note 275
and accompanying text. Because Mexico assumed such obligations after the statutory deadline date
of January 1, 1983, the ITC concluded that it lacked the legal authority pursuant to the transition
rules of the Trade Agreements Act to conduct an injury investigation. Letter From ITC Secretary.
349 Certain Fasteners From India; Final Results of Administrative Review and Partial Revocation
of Countervailing Duty Order, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,129, 44,130-131 (1982).
350 47 Fed. Reg. at 44,130-131.
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countervailing duty investigation.351
After Commerce had published the countervailing order in the Fed-
eral Register, some of the subject merchandise became duty free pursuant
to the GSP program.352 Commerce concluded that this change in status
entitled India to an injury determination for the duty-free merchandise in
question.353 When the ITC informed Commerce that the relevant provi-
sions of the Tariff Act did not authorize an injury investigation under
such circumstances, Commerce concluded that "absent an affirmative in-
jury determination, [the agency] lacks the legal authority to impose
countervailing duties on... duty-free fasteners from India. ''354 Com-
merce determined that the partial revocation of the order was warranted
under those circumstances.355
When Commerce revisited this issue in the context of the ten out-
standing countervailing duty orders covering duty-free imports from
Mexico, the agency concluded that "it would be inappropriate.., as [the
Mexican] respondents would have it, [to] revoke the order[s] for want of
[an injury] determination. ' 356 In the "changed circumstances" adminis-
trative review involving Lime From Mexico, mentioned above, Com-
merce explained that clear Congressional intent warranted a departure
from the Indian Fasteners approach:
Congress has not specifically addressed the anomalous situation faced in
[the Mexican] case. However, Congress made clear its intent to provide an
injury determination for merchandise entered duty-free from a contracting
party to the GATT in the legislative history of the Trade Act of 1974. See,
S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 185.
Commerce further explained in Lime From Mexico:
[Although] section 303(a)(2) [of the Tariff Act] does not contemplate con-
ducting an injury investigation pursuant to a specific provision of the stat-
ute... [p]rior to [the 1979 Trade Agreements Act], section 303(b)(A) [of
the Tariff Act], which has since been repealed [by the 1979 Act], required
the ITC to conduct "such investigation as it deemed necessary, whether an
industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is pre-
vented from being established, by reason of the importation of such article
or merchandise into the United States" in order to fulfill U.S. international
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 44,131.
355 Id.; Cf. Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Trinidad and Tobago, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,561 (1985), 52
Fed. Reg. 45,982 (1987) (although Commerce preliminarily determined to revoke outstanding coun-
tervailing duty order based upon circumstances similar to those of Indian Fasteners, Commerce
ultimately revoked order based upon U.S. industry's lack of interest in maintaining the order).
356 54 Fed. Reg. at 49,327.
357 Id.
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obligations for an injury determination .... 358
Based upon Congress' clear intent, Commerce determined that
Mexico's accession to the GATT did not entitle post-GATT accession
entries of duty-free merchandise from Mexico to an automatic revocation
of the relevant countervailing duty orders.359 Although it appeared that
the United States lacked the legal authority pursuant to its domestic law
to provide an injury test for such merchandise, Commerce, the ITC, and
the Office of the United States Trade Representative engaged in several
inter-agency discussions to find a solution to comply with U.S. legal obli-
gations vis-a-vis Mexico.
The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government ultimately decided
to avail itself of a unique administrative procedure to comply with its
international GATT obligations. Instead of attempting to conduct a
traditional injury investigation pursuant to Title VII of the Tariff Act,
the United States decided to undertake an injury investigation pursuant
to section 332(g) of the Tariff Act.3 6 Section 332(g), never before used
to conduct an injury investigation in a U.S. antidumping or counter-
vailing duty proceeding, authorizes the ITC to "make such investigations
and reports as may be requested by the President [of the United
States] ' 361 and to "investigate the operation of the customs laws.""362
Before availing itself of this novel administrative procedure, the
United States first had to overcome certain procedural obstacles. The
most important of these obstacles involved the availability of judicial re-
view in a section 332(g) investigation. When enacting the Trade Agree-
ments Act in 1979, Congress conferred a statutory right of judicial
review upon "interested parties" participating in U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings.363 Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act,
however, does not provide for judicial review. 36
To preserve an "interested party's" statutory right to judicial review
for this section 332(g) injury investigation, the Executive Branch of the
U.S. Government decided that "[Commerce], not the ITC, [would be]
the decision maker in the [section 332(g)] injury investigation. ' 365 In
other words, the ITC first would conduct a section 332(g) injury investi-
gation by adhering as closely as practicable to the traditional procedures
358 Id. (emphasis added).
359 Id.
360 Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1332(g) (1990).
361 19 U.S.C. § 1332(g) (1990).
362 Id.
363 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a et seq. (1982).
364 19 U.S.C. § 1332(g) (1990).
365 54 Fed. Reg at 49,329.
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and substantive requirements of Title VII of the Tariff Act. Specifically,
the ITC would conduct an investigation into, and report to the President
on, "whether (1) an industry in the United States would be materially
injured, or would be threatened with material injury, or (2) the establish-
ment of an industry would be materially retarded, if [Commerce] were to
revoke" '366 a particular countervailing duty order covering duty-free im-
ports from Mexico.3 67
After performing the section 332(g) injury investigation, the ITC
would present its findings of fact to Commerce.368 Commerce then
would draw the legal conclusion, based upon the ITC's findings, concern-
ing whether the revocation of the relevant countervailing duty order
would cause, or threaten to cause, material injury to the relevant U.S.
domestic industry.3 69 An "interested party" dissatisfied with Com-
merce's injury conclusion could contest the final Commerce determina-
tion at the CIT.370
The United States explained its decision to resort to this novel ad-
ministrative procedure in the following manner:
Given that we are faced with a circumstance that can best be described as a
"gap" in the law, we are persuaded that the current procedure is appropri-
ate in light of the settled principle of administrative law that where the
intent and object of a statute are manifest, agency action consistent with the
intent [of the statute] is a proper exercise of an agency's authority.
The courts have held that [Commerce] has the authority to implement the
intent of legislation designed to fulfill the international obligations of the
United States, even where the legislation itself contains a gap with regard to
meeting those obligations and the general intent of Congress. See, Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. United States, 529 F. Supp. 670 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1981), and United States Steel v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 496
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed as moot, 792 F.2d 1101.371
Although duty-free imports of Mexican origin were subject to ten
outstanding countervailing duty orders when Mexico acceded to the
GATT, the United States has not had to resort to section 332(g) in all ten
cases. Commerce has been able to revoke seven of the outstanding orders
based upon the relevant U.S. domestic industry's lack of interest in main-
366 55 Fed. Reg. 32,672, 32,673 (1990).
367 Id.
368 54 Fed. Reg. at 49,329-330.
369 See, eg., Lime From Mexico, 54 Fed. Reg. at 49,329-49,330 (Commerce injury
determination).
370 The CIT also might have jurisdiction of a final Commerce injury determination pursuant to
the court's residual jurisdictional authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1990).
371 54 Fed. Reg. at 49,327.
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taining the relevant orders.3 72
As of the writing of this Article, the President of the United States,
through the United States Trade Representative, has requested the ITC,
pursuant to section 332(g) of the Tariff Act, to conduct an injury investi-
gation in Lime From Mexico, Fabricated Automotive Glass From Mexico,
and Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico.373
The ITC completed its section 332(g) injury investigations in the first two
administrative proceedings and, as of the writing of this Article, is still
conducting an injury investigation in Portland Hydraulic Cement and
Cement Clinker.374
In Lime and in Fabricated Automotive Glass, the ITC's factual find-
ings demonstrated that the revocation of the relevant countervailing duty
orders would not cause material injury, or the threat of injury, to the
relevant U.S. domestic industry.375 Based upon these findings, Com-
merce revoked the countervailing duty order covering lime from Mexico
in a "changed circumstances" administrative review conducted pursuant
to section 751(b) of the Tariff Act. 376 The effective date of the revocation
was August 24, 1986, the date of Mexico's accession to the GATT.377 As
of the writing of this Article, Commerce is conducting a "changed cir-
cumstances" administrative review in Fabricated Automotive Glass From
Mexico to determine whether the ITC's negative injury finding warrants
the revocation of the relevant countervailing duty order as well.378
C. International Obligations Assumed By Mexico In The U.S.-
Mexico Understanding
The U.S-Mexico bilateral Understanding granted Mexico an injury
test in U.S. countervailing duty investigations "in exchange for a Mexi-
372 Carbon Black from Mexico, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,163 (1989); Bricksfrom Mexico, 54 Fed. Reg.
53,163 (1989); Certain Textile Mill Products from Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 5,641 (1990) (partial revoca-
tion); Toy Balloons Including Punchballs and Playballs from Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 4,217 (1990);
Litharge, Red Lead, and Lead Stabilizers, 55 Fed. Reg. 5869 (1990) (partial revocation); Iron-Metal
Construction Castings From Mexico, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,498 (1990); and Polypropylene Film From Mex-
ico, 55 Fed. Reg. 5,643 (1990).
373 54 Fed. Reg. at 49,327; 55 Fed. Reg. at 32,672; - Fed. Reg. - (1991).
374 Conditions of Competition Between US. and Mexican Lime in the United States Market,
USITC Pub. No. 2210 (1989); Conditions of Competition Between US. and Mexican Fabricated Au-
tomotive Glass in the United States Market, Inv. No. 332-286 (1990); Letter From USTR To Chair-
man Of ITC Requesting Section 332(g) Injury Investigation In Portland Hydraulic Cement And
Cement Clinker From Mexico (Nov. 2, 1990).
375 Id.
376 Lime from Mexico; Final Results of Changed Circumstances Countervailing Duty Administra-
tive Review and Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,324 (1989).
377 Id. at 49,330.
378 55 Fed. Reg. at 32,672.
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can commitment to eliminate export subsidies' 379 and to refrain from
bestowing certain domestic subsidies that "would adversely affect the
conditions of normal competition. 3 80 This commitment is analogous to
the obligations undertaken by the signatories to the GATT Subsidies
Code.381 In particular, Mexico obligated itself to discontinue granting
export subsidies through two programs: the program of Certificados de
Devolucion de Impuestos ("CEDI") and the Fund for the Promotion of
Exports of Mexican Manufactured Products ("FOMEX").38 2
A CEDI is a tax certificate issued by the Mexican government to a
Mexican exporter in an amount equal to a set percentage of the annual
value of the company's export sales 383 The Mexican company can use
this certificate to pay taxes due within a given year.3 "' Because the re-
ceipt of the tax certificate is contingent upon export performance, the
CEDI program per se is countervailable in accordance with the Tariff
Act and the GATT Subsidies Code. 38 5 By signing the Understanding,
the Government of Mexico pledged "not to grant [or reintroduce] the
export subsidy elements of the [CEDI] program. 3 6
Recent countervailing duty administrative reviews issued by Com-
merce demonstrate that Mexico has adhered to this obligation.38 7 Specif-
ically, Commerce has determined that no Mexican exports subject to
U.S. countervailing duty orders have received benefits pursuant to the
CEDI program after the effective date of the Understanding.388 Further-
more, Commerce has determined, based upon information supplied by
the Government of Mexico, that the CEDI program for Mexican manu-
facturers was abolished in 1982.389 Although these administrative find-
ings have been the subject of recent court challenges brought by U.S.
producers and manufacturers, the CIT, as of the writing of this Article,
has sustained all of these findings.39 °
379 See supra note 1, at 1.
380 See id. at para. 3.
381 See supra note 243.
382 See supra note 1, at para. 2.
383 Unprocessed Float Glass From Mexico, Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative
Review, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,503 (1986); Ceramic Tile from Mexico; Preliminary Results of Administra-
tive Review of Countervailing Duty Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,735 (1984).
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 See supra note 1, at 2(A).
387 See supra note 383; Fabricated Automotive Glass From Mexico; Final Results Of Counter-
vailing Duty Administrative Review, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,652 (1989).
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 PpG Industries; In v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 195 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989)("PPG Ii'); PPG
Industries, Inc., v. United States, Slip Op. 90-75 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) ("PPG IIP').
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The FOMEX program is a trust created by the Government of Mex-
ico to promote the sale of manufactured products.391 The Mexican Treas-
ury Department - in conjunction with the Banco de Mexico, Mexico's
central bank, acting as trustee - administers the program.392 The
FOMEX program provides pre-export and export financing to Mexican
exporters at preferential interest rates. 393 Because the bestowal of both
pre-export and export loans is based upon export activity, the FOMEX
loan program per se is countervailable pursuant to U.S. law and the
GATT Subsidies Code.3 94
Pursuant to the Understanding, the Government of Mexico obli-
gated itself to phase out the export subsidy element of this program.395
The government pledged to set FOMEX interest rates "at a rate [no]
lower than the yield on the most recent auction of 90-day Treasury Bills
of the Government of the United Mexican States .... 3 96 Although
Mexico generally has adhered to the terms of this obligation, Commerce
consistently has directed Customs in recent administrative reviews to im-
pose countervailing duties upon Mexican products to offset countervail-
able benefits derived from the FOMEX loan program.39 7
The principal reason for these determinations is that, in accordance
with its long-standing administrative practice, Commerce focuses exclu-
sively upon the benefit, if any, derived by the recipient of a foreign gov-
ernment loan to determine whether the loan is countervailable.398
Certain Mexican exporters, however, have contended that the applica-
tion of this standard or benchmark to FOMEX loans violates the express
terms of the Understanding. 399 These exporters contend that the Under-
standing, at paragraph 2, requires the United States to apply the cost-to-
government standard to determine whether "FOMEX financing is a
countervailable subsidy and [to] measur[e] the benefit from such financ-
ing ....
The United States has defended the use of the benefit-to-the-recipi-
391 Certain Textile Mill Products from Mexico; Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Ad-
ministrative Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 20,504 (1990); Fabricated Automotive Glass from Mexico, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 44,652.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 See supra note 1, at 2(c).
396 Id.
397 See, eg., Certain Textile Mill Products from Mexico; Final Results of Countervailing Duty
Administrative Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 36, 841, 36,843 (1989).
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Id.; see supra note 1, at para. 2(c).
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ent standard in the context of evaluating FOMEX loans. In a recent
administrative review involving Certain Textile Mill Products From Mex-
ico, for example, Commerce emphasized that the "cost-to-the-govern-
ment standard in the Understanding applies only to whether Mexico is in
compliance with the Understanding and does not limit the United States
in applying its own national countervailing duty law with regard to subsi-
dized imports from Mexico."40 1 In this regard, the Understanding, at
paragraph 6, provides in relevant part that "[n]o provision of this Under-
standing shall be construed to prevent the United States from finally im-
posing countervailing duties pursuant to its national law on products of
Mexico receiving subsidies of any kind .. ..,402
Commerce traditionally has used the benefit-to-the-recipient stan-
dard, rather than the cost-to-the-government standard, to measure the
value of countervailable benefits derived from a foreign government loan.
The policy underlying this administrative practice is that, in order to
determine whether a foreign manufacturer or exporter has received
countervailable benefits from such a loan, Commerce must ascertain
whether the terms of that loan are inconsistent with commercial
considerations.40
Even though a government loan may satisfy the cost-to-the-govern-
ment standard, because the interest rate of that loan is higher than the
costs incurred by the government to obtain the funds, the terms of that
loan still may be inconsistent with commercial considerations.' °4 If, for
example, the interest rate of the foreign government loan is lower than
the national average commercial borrowing rate to which the loan recipi-
ent has access, the recipient will enjoy a countervailable benefit.40
Despite Commerce's recent findings that the FOMEX loan program
continues to provide countervailable benefits, these findings have sparked
relatively little controversy. The principal reason for this result is that
assessment rates for U.S. imports of Mexican origin benefitting from
FOMEX loans have declined significantly as a direct consequence of
Mexico's adherence to the Understanding.' Moreover, the Mexican
government's recent announcement to "terminate""4 7 the FOMEX loan
401 54 Fed. Reg. at 36,843.
402 See supra note 1, at para. 6 (emphasis added).
403 54 Fed. Reg. at 36,843.
404 See id.
405 See id.
406 Compare 50 Fed. Reg. at 1,906 with 51 Fed. Reg. at 44,652.
407 Letter From Dr. Herminio Blanco Mendoza, Mexico's Under Secretary for Foreign Trade, to
The Honorable J. Michael Farren, Under Secretary for International Trade, U.S. Department of
Commerce (June 1, 1990).
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program should quell any remaining controversy surrounding Com-
merce's application of the benefit-to-the-recipient standard.
As demonstrated by the parties' decision in 1988 to extend the life of
the Understanding for an additional period of three years, 40 8 both the
United States and Mexico generally are satisfied with the implementation
of this bilateral agreement. Although the implementation of the Under-
standing with regard to the CEDI and FOMEX programs has stirred
some debate in both countries, such debate has not reached the level of
that surrounding Mexico's right to an injury test in U.S. countervailing
duty proceedings and the application of the so-called "specificity test," as
discussed in the next subsection.
D. Countervailabiity Of Domestic Subsidies: The So-Called
"Specificity Test"
1. Background
National governments historically have provided certain goods and
services to their citizenry either free of charge or at prices substantially
below free market rates. The bestowal of goods and services upon such
terms constitutes a subsidy.4Y 9 Governments typically grant subsidies to
specific individuals, enterprises, industries, or specific groups of enter-
prises or industries, that comprise a particular society (ie., "specific sub-
sidies"). Governments also grant subsidies to all members of their
society (Le., "general subsidies").
"Specific subsidies," as their name implies, usually enable specific
corporate individuals to gain an arguably unfair competitive advantage
over other domestic producers or foreign manufacturers. "General sub-
sidies," on the other hand, typically do not give individuals an unfair
advantage over their domestic or foreign rivals. These subsidies are usu-
ally necessary because of the inability of the price system to distribute or
supply certain essential goods and services to all members of a society.'"0
These goods and services, often referred to as public goods, include na-
tional defense, education, public health, basic infrastructure, and the
like. 4
1 1
The Tariff Act classifies subsidies into two categories: export subsi-
dies and domestic subsidies.412 Export subsidies are government pro-
408 Letter From USTR Yeutter to Mexico's Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development
(April 21, 1988).
409 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1677(5) (1990).
410 Cabot Crp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 731-732 n.8 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) ("Cabot P).
411 Id.
412 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1990).
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grams that grant benefits to domestic manufacturers based upon export
activity or export performance.413 These subsidies are analogous to "spe-
cific subsidies" in that they usually enable specific corporate individuals
to gain a competitive advantage over, among other entities, U.S. manu-
facturers in the U.S. market. As stated in the previous subsection, export
subsidies per se are countervailable pursuant to the Tariff Act and the
GATT Subsidies Code.414
Domestic subsidies, on the other hand, are foreign government pro-
grams that provide goods or services either to specific members or groups
in a society or to all members in a society.415 In contrast to export subsi-
dies, domestic subsidies are not contingent upon export activity or export
performance.416 Only those domestic subsidies that grant a preference to
"a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or indus-
tries, '4 17 within the meaning of section 771(5) of the Tariff Act, are
countervailable.41 8 A so-called "preference" is a foreign government
program that provides specific recipients with goods, services, or financ-
ing at prices or on terms more favorable than those available to other
recipients in exporting country.419 Examples of countervailable domestic
subsidies include equity infusions and loan guaranties on noncommercial
terms.420
In order to determine whether a particular domestic subsidy pro-
motes the production of specific products and, therefore, is countervail-
able pursuant to the Tariff Act, Commerce originally employed the so-
called "general availability" test.421 The term "general availability," as
articulated by the CIT, "means that what is available is accessible to all
who are similarly situated."' 4 After first endorsing this test, the CIT
later rejected it in Cabot Corp. v. United States ("Cabot p). 42 3 As a re-
suit of this judicial decision, Commerce adopted the so-called "de facto
specificity test. 424
413 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5XAXi) (1990); fllustrative List of Export Subsidies, GATT Subsidies Code
Annex, supra note 243. A tax rebate based upon export performance is one example of an export
subsidy. Illustrative List at (e).
414 Id.
415 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5XA)(ii) (1990).
416 See id.
417 Id. (emphasis added).
418 See id.
419 Id.
420 Id.; Knoll, An Economic Approach, at 45.
421 See Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F.Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
422 United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 566 F.Supp. 1529, 1537 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
423 620 F. Supp. 722.
424 PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), appealpending, 88-1175
(,PPG P').
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Two decisions recently issued by the CIT, however, have called into
question Commerce's application of this test.42 One of these decisions
apparently has introduced yet another approach to determine whether a
domestic subsidy is countervailable.426 As a result of these decisions, it
appears that the Federal Circuit ultimately may have to settle the variety
of legal issues concerning the countervailability of domestic subsidies
pursuant to the Tariff Act.
2. The Demise Of The "General Availability" Test And The
Emergence Of The So-Called "De Facto Specificity Test"
In the lawsuits stemming from the countervailing duty proceedings
involving Carbon Black From Mexico, the CIT explained Commerce's
"general availability" test in the following manner:
The generally available benefits rule as articulated by [Commerce] is essen-
tially that benefits available to all companies and industries within an econ-
omy are not countervailable subsidies. *[Commerce's] conclusions are
primarily drawn from 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B), which refers to countervail-
able domestic subsidies as being those provided to "a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries. .. ." (emphasis added).
Thus, argues [Commerce], benefits "generally available" to all enterprises
or industries are not subsidies under section 1677(5)(B), and therefore do
not fall within the meaning of "bounty or grant" as used in section 1303.427
Even though the CIT embraced this test in Carlisle Tire and Rubber v.
United States,42 the court began to retreat from this position in Bethle-
hem Steel Corp. v. United States42 9 and in Agrexco, Agricultural Export
Co., Ltd. v. United States.430 In Cabot I, mentioned above, Judge Car-
man unequivocally struck down Commerce's application of the "general
availability" standard.43' In so doing, Judge Carman explained:
Apparently [Commerce] and the court in Carlisle view the noncountervai-
lability of generally available benefits as the opposite side of the coin from
the countervailability of benefits conferred upon a specific class. There is a
distinction, however, which has not been clearly deciphered by [Commerce]
or in prior judicial opinions, but which disrupts the apparent symmetry of
the two sides of the coin.
The distinction that has evaded [Commerce] is that
not all so-called generally available benefits are alike - some are benefits
425 Armco, Inc. v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1514 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990); Roses, Inc, California
Floral Trade Council v. United States, Slip Op. 90-64 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
426 733 F. Supp. 1514.
427 Cabot I, 620 F. Supp. at 731 (emphasis supplied in original).
428 564 F: Supp. 834.
429 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
430 604 F. Supp. 1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
431 Cabot 1, 620 F. Supp. at 731-732.
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accruing generally to all citizens, while others are benefits that when actu-
ally conferred accrue to specific individuals or classes. Thus, while it is true
that a generalized benefit provided by government, such as national defense,
education or infrastructure, is not a countervailable bounty or grant, a gen-
erally available benefit - one that may be obtained by any and all enter-
prises or industries - may nevertheless accrue to specific recipients.
General benefits are not conferred upon any specific individuals or classes,
while generally available benefits, when actually bestowed, may constitute
specific grants conferred upon specific identifiable entities, which would be
subject to countervailing duties.432
Judge Carman then proceeded to explain the appropriate legal stan-
dard that Commerce must use to determine whether a domestic subsidy
is countervailable pursuant to the Tariff Act. In the words of Judge
Carman:
The appropriate standard [for determining the countervailability of domes-
tic benefits] focuses on the de facto case by case effect of [such] benefits
provided to recipients rather than on the nominal availability of benefits.
This definition [of bounty or grant or subsidy] requires focussing only on
whether a benefit or "competitive advantage" has been actually conferred
on a "specific enterprise or industry, or a group of enterprises or
industries."
Once it has been determined that there has been a bestowal upon a specific
class, the second aspect of the definition of bounty or grant requires looking
at the bestowal and determining if it amounts to an additional benefit or
competitive advantage. If so, the benefit might fit within one of the illustra-
tive examples of 19 US.C. [section] 1677(5)(B).' a
The legal standard enunciated by Judge Carman in Cabot I became
known as, for want of a better term, the "de facto specificity test.,434 In
a subsequent decision involving the same parties in Cabot I, Cabot v.
United States ("Cabot IP'), Judge Carman reaffirmed the same legal prin-
ciples and legal standard laid down in Cabot /43
The language quoted above from Cabot I requires Commerce to un-
dertake a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a domestic subsidy
is countervailable pursuant to the Tariff Act. First, Commerce must de-
termine on a case-by-case basis whether a specific domestic enterprise or
industry in fact received any benefits from a foreign government program
during the period under investigation. This analysis appears to require
the compilation of a list of all the domestic firms that participated in the
432 Id. at 731 (emphasis supplied in original).
433 Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
434 662 F. Supp. at 258.
435 Cabot Corp. v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 949 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988)("Cabot IP).
239
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:177(1990)
program during the relevant period. Nominal general availability is not,
in and of itself, determinative of a finding of nonspecificity in accordance
with this analysis.
Second, once Commerce has determined that "there has been a be-
stowal upon a specific class,"'436 the agency apparently must ascertain
whether, in the words of Judge Carman, the subsidy in question confers a
"competitive advantage' 437 upon the domestic recipient. Although the
meaning of the term "competitive advantage" has been subject to some
debate, the use of this term, as demonstrated by the relevant passages in
Cabot I and Cabot II, seems to constitute nothing more than a restate-
ment of the preference test set forth in the countervailing duty statute.
4 38
In other words, Commerce, as explained above, must determine
whether the government program provides specific recipients either with
funds on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations in the ex-
porting country or with goods or services at prices more favorable than
those available to other recipients in that country.439 To determine
whether a foreign government program is preferential, Commerce com-
pares the terms of the government loan or the value of the government
supplied goods or services with an objective "benchmark" value calcu-
lated for such loans, goods, or services."' This comparison enables
Commerce to determine not only whether a countervailable benefit exists
but also the value of that benefit.
44 1
For example, Commerce typically compares the terms of a loan
(e.g., interest rate) provided by a foreign government to a specific recipi-
ent with the terms offered by the government to other recipients in the
exporting country.' 2 Commerce also may compare the government
terms with the terms offered by private commercial lenders in the export-
ing country.' 3 Similarly, Commerce usually compares the price of
goods or services supplied by a foreign government to a specific recipient
with the price of identical or comparable goods and services sold by the
government to other recipients in the exporting country. 4 " Commerce
436 620 F. Supp. at 732.
437 Id.
438 Id.; 694 F. Supp. at 957.
439 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(il) (1990).
4 4 0 See id.
441 Id.
442 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(I) (1990); Powell & McInerney, International Energy Trade and
the Unfair Trade Laws, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 359-360 (1989) [hereinafter "International En-
ergy Trade"].
443 See id.
444 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(II) (1990); Preferentiality Appendix, 51 Fed. Reg. at 13,272-13,273
(1986).
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also may compare under certain circumstances the price of the govern-
ment supplied good or service with the price of identical or comparable
goods or services sold by private companies in the exporting country." 5
In the remand determination resulting from the first administrative
review involving Carbon Black From Mexico, the CIT specifically re-
quired Commerce to apply the exacting principles laid down in Cabot I
and Cabot 11.446 Accordingly, the CIT required Commerce to conduct a
rigorous defacto or "use" analysis to determine whether the bestowal of
carbon black feedstock and natural gas by the Mexican government at
below-world-market prices constituted countervailable domestic
subsidies.' 7
Commerce found that even though the carbon black feedstock sup-
plied by the Government of Mexico was nominally available to all produ-
cers and industries in Mexico, only two domestic producers of carbon
black, in fact, had participated in that program." 8 Commerce deter-
mined under these circumstances that the program provided a domestic
benefit to a "specific enterprise or industry" within the meaning of sec-
tion 771 of the Tariff Act." 9 Commerce also determined that the prices
charged by the Government of Mexico to the two Mexican producers of
carbon black were preferential.4 50 Therefore, Commerce determined that
the provision of carbon black feedstock constituted a countervailable do-
mestic subsidy.45 The CIT affirmed these remand results.4 52
In the same remand determination, however, Commerce found that
the Government of Mexico had sold natural gas to more than 3,700 Mex-
ican enterprises at the same price during the relevant period.45a Com-
merce determined under these circumstances that the government
program did not satisfy the specificity requirement of the statute and,
445 See id.
446 694 F. Supp. at 955-959.
447 Id.
448 Cabot Corp. v. United States, No. 86-09-01109, at 10-12 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 21, 1988)(recon-
sideration pursuant to remand); Carbon Black From Mexico; Preliminary Results of Countervailing
Duty Administrative Review, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,271-73 (1986); Carbon Black From Mexico;
Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,385, 30,386 (1986).
449 Id.
450 Id. To determine whether the price of the carbon black feedstock supplied by the Govern-
ment of Mexico to the two Mexican producers of carbon black was preferential, Commerce com-
pared that price with the price of a similar product supplied by the government to other recipients in
Mexico. Id. This comparison yielded a countervailable benefit in the amount of 1.90 percent ad
valorem. 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,386.
451 See supra note 448.
452 Cabot Corp. v. United States, No. 86-09-01109 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 21, 1988).
453 Id. at 6-9.
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therefore, did not constitute a countervailable domestic subsidy.454 The
CIT affirmed these remand results as well.455
In PPG Industies, Ina v. U.S. ("PPG P'), another case involving the
alleged bestowal of domestic benefits, the CIT again reaffirmed the de
facto standard established in the earlier Cabot decisions.456 In so doing,
the court also sought to clarify certain aspects of that standard. First,
Judge Carman noted in PPG I that neither Cabot I nor Cabot II had
eliminated altogether Commerce's "general availability" test. Rather,
nominal general availability, according to Judge Carman, is still a factor
that Commerce must evaluate when determining whether a domestic
subsidy is countervailable:
Although general availability may be a manifestation that a program has
not conferred a benefit upon a specific recipient, general availability is not
the statutory test. It is merely one of the several relevant factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether or not a benefit or competitive advantage has
been conferred uon a "specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises
or industries."45
Second, and more important, Judge Carman apparently relaxed the
application of the de facto or "use" standard established in the Cabot
decisions. Specifically, the CIT in PPG I did not require Commerce to
compile a list of the domestic enterprises that actually had participated in
the foreign government programs at issue. Instead, the court focused
upon the eligibility requirements of one of the Mexican government pro-
grams and concluded that the requirements did not "de facto render the
benefit one which is provided to a specific enterprise or industry or group
of enterprises or industries.""45
The CIT also accepted Commerce's explanation with regard to the
other Mexican government program at issue and similarly did not re-
quire the compilation of the number of firms that had participated in that
program either. Rather, the court was satisfied with Commerce's deter-
mination that the Mexican respondent companies "received no
countervailable benefit[s],"459 because the record evidence demonstrated
that the companies had "paid the published price for [the government
supplied] natural gas that was available to all industries" in Mexico.46
The CIT's decision in PPG I is currently subject to an appeal before
454 Id.
455 Id.
456 662 F. Supp at 258.
457 Id. at 265.
458 Id. at 266.
459 Id. at 272.
460 Id.
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the Federal Circuit." As of the writing of this Article, this appeal has
been pending in the appellate court for more than two years. If the Fed-
eral Circuit affirms the CIT's decision in PPG I, then Commerce's cur-
rent administrative practice with regard to domestic subsidies should
remain relatively unchanged. If, however, the Federal Circuit reverses
this decision, then a broad range of previously noncountervailable do-
mestic programs might become countervailable. In that case, foreign
products subject to a U.S. countervailing duty investigation or adminis-
trative review initiated before August 23, 1988 - the effective date of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "1988 Trade
Act") - might be subject to additional countervailing duties.' 2
3. Current Status Of The De Facto "'Specificity Test"
In 1988, the U.S. Congress codified Judge Carman's de facto or
"use" standard into the U.S. countervailing duty law by passing the 1988
Trade Act. Specifically, Congress enacted a "special rule" to govern do-
mestic subsidies (the "1988 amendment") and, thereby, amended the
Tariff Act." 3 The "special rule" provides:
In applying [the general definition of a domestic subsidy], [Commerce], in
each investigation, shall determine whether the bounty, grant, or subsidy in
law [de jure analysis] or in fact [de facto analysis] is provided to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries. Nominal gen-
eral availability, under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or rule
establishing a bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a
basis for determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not
been, in fact provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group
thereof.46
The Senate Finance Committee report accompanying this amend-
ment further provides:
The [Senate] Committee [on Finance] intends that this provision codify the
holding of the U.S. Court of International Trade in [Cabot 1, as clarified by
the CIT's decision in PPG 1] that, in order to determine whether a domestic
subsidy is countervailable, the Commerce Department must examine on a
case-by-case basis whether the benefits provided by a program are bestowed
upon a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.
A subsidy provided in law to a specific industry is clearly countervailable.
461 See supra note 424.
462 Section 1337(b) of the 1988 Trade Act provides that section 1312, which codified the Cabot
and PPG decisions regarding the specificity test for domestic subsidies, "shall only apply with respect
to investigations and reviews initiated after the date of enactment of this Act [August 23, 1988]."
102 Stat. 1211.
463 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1990); Pub. L. 100-418, § 1312, 102 Stat. 1211 (1988).
464 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1990) (emphasis added).
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The issue addressed in Cabot is whether a subsidy provided in fact to a
specific industry is countervailable. 46 5
This "special rule" for domestic subsidies, along with its accompa-
nying dejure and defacto analysis, governs all countervailing duty inves-
tigations and administrative reviews commenced on or after the effective
date of the 1988 Trade Act - that is, August 23, 1988.46 6 Accordingly,
if, as explained above, the Federal Circuit reverses PPG I and adopts a
statutory test that favors U.S. domestic petitioners, then, because of the
effective date of the 1988 amendment, such a test will apply only in those
countervailing duty proceedings initiated before August 23, 1988."1
By the time Congress codified this "special rule" into the statute,
Commerce already had been conducting a dejure and defacto analysis to
evaluate specificity. 46 In accordance with this two-part analysis, which
constitutes the agency's current administrative practice,469 Commerce
first seeks to determine on a de jure basis whether a particular foreign
government program appears on its face to confer specific benefits470 . In
this regard, Commerce examines the language of the enacting legislation
and implementing regulations of the foreign government program to de-
termine the extent to which the government limits the availability of the
program.471
If, after undertaking this dejure analysis, Commerce is able to con-
clude that the program is limited to specific recipients, then the agency
usually will forego undertaking a de facto analysis.472 Instead, Com-
merce will proceed to determine whether the program grants a prefer-
ence to the specific recipients.473 If Commerce concludes that the
program is preferential, then it will countervail the program in the
amount of the measured benefit.4 ' 4
If, however, this de jure analysis does not enable Commerce to de-
termine that the program is limited to specific recipients, then the agency
465 S. Rep. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 122-123 (1987) (emphasis added).
466 See supra note 462; Powell & McInerney, International Energy Trade at 354-355, 357.
467 See id.
468 Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986)(prel"minaxy
determination).
469 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, Carbon
Steel Wire Rod From Malaysia, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,303, 13,304 (1988); Annco, Inc. v. United States, 733
F. Supp. 1514, 1528 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
470 Armco, supra note 469, at 1528.
471 Id.
472 Id.
473 Id.
474 Id.
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will conduct a de facto analysis.4 75 This analysis entails focussing upon
"whether there is a disproportionate level of use by the industry under
investigation or evidence of government discretion in the award of the
benefit."476 If, after undertaking this defacto analysis, Commerce deter-
mines that the program is not limited to specific recipients, then the
agency will not countervail the foreign government program.477
Although this analysis seems to be in harmony with the Cabot and
PPG I decisions, in addition to the 1988 "special rule" for domestic sub-
sidies, two recent decisions issued by the CIT apparently have questioned
this analysis. InArmco, Inc, v. U.S., the CIT stated that the above anal-
ysis "appears to be substantially identical to the 'generally available bene-
fits' test rejected by the Court in Cabot; apparently only the name is
changed.""47 The CIT further stated in Armco that "[a]s the Cabot
Court rejected the 'generally available benefits' test, so this Court rejects
the 'specificity' test relied upon by the government in this case."47 9
According to the CIT in Armco, the appropriate legal standard
should focus upon the inherent "unfair[ness]" of the domestic subsidy at
issue.4 0 The Armco decision suggests that Commerce may be required
in certain circumstances to analyze specificity by comparing the benefits
received by a firm in the exporting country with the benefits, if any, re-
ceived by its U.S. competitor.4 ' This approach, however, conflicts with
Commerce's long-standing administrative practice of comparing the ben-
efits received by a firm in the exporting country with the benefits received
by other firms in that country.4 82
Despite this conflict, it appears that the CIT may have followed the
Armco approach in a subsequent decision. In Roses, Inc., California Flo-
ral Trade Council v. United States, the CIT stated that Commerce "must
always focus on whether an advantage in international commerce has
been bestowed on a discrete class of grantees" to determine whether a
domestic subsidy is countervailable.48 3 Accordingly, the CIT ordered
the agency to determine upon remand whether the Mexican flower indus-
try had "received benefits, bestowed on a discrete class, which gave it a
475 Id.
476 Id.
477 Id.
478 733 F. Supp. at 1529.
479 Id.
480 Id. at 1530.
481 See id.
482 Powell & Mclnetney, International Energy Trade, at 359-360.
483 Slip Op. 90-64 at 25.
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comparative advantage in international commerce.' 484
Such an approach to evaluate specificity not only deviates from
long-standing Commerce practice, but also appears to be in conflict with
a long line of judicial decisions and the 1988 "special rule" for domestic
subsidies. In the Cabot cases, PPG 1, and PPG Industries, Inc. v. U.S.,
("PPG IF'), the U.S. domestic petitioners contended that the bestowal of
goods or services by a foreign government to its domestic clientele at
below-world-market prices per se is a countervailable subsidy (Le., the so-
called "Cabot rule").4 8 In categorically rejecting this contention, Judge
Carman stated in PPG II that "[t]here is no such rule as the 'Cabot
rule' "486 and also declared in PPG I:
[I]t is well established that the mere existence of a price differential between
exported and domestic prices, does not in and of itself confer a bounty or
grant under [section] 1303. See, eg., United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
64 CCPA 130, 138, C.A.D. 1195, 562 F.2d 1209, 1216 (CCPA 1977), aff'd,
437 U.S. 443, 98 S. Ct. 2441, 57 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1978)("Congress has not
statutorily required that every governmental action distinguishing between
products consumed at home and those exported shall be deemed the be-
stowing of a bounty or grant.") 487
In Can-Am Corp. v. United States the CIT quoted with approval this
language from PPG I and, consequently, embraced Judge Carman's ra-
tionale.48 The CIT in Can-Am Corp sustained Commerce's determina-
tion not to countervail a Mexican government program simply because
the program bestowed fuel oil at below-world-market prices.4 89
The U.S. Congress apparently endorsed the Judge Carman view
when enacting the "special rule" governing domestic subsidies. Congress
appears to have done so by "codifying the holding of... Cabot P"'49 and
by rejecting the version of the "special rule" passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives.4 91 Significantly, the conferees rejected the accompany-
ing House report that contained language that might have required Com-
merce to analyze specificity by determining whether a particular
government program conferred a "competitive advantage in interna-
tional commerce."492
484 Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
485 620 F. Supp. at 733, n.9; 694 F. Supp. at 958, n.9; 662 F.Supp. at 270-272; 712 F. Supp. 195,
200-201 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
486 712 F. Supp. at 201.
487 662 F. Supp. at 272.
488 664 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
489 Id.
490 See supra note 465.
491 See Powell & McInerney, International Energy Trade, at 355-356, n.91.
492 H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1987).
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Although it is not altogether certain that the Armco and Roses deci-
sions have introduced yet a third legal standard to evaluate specificity,
these cases do suggest that the statutory test is currently in a state of flux.
If this state of flux continues, then certain foreign government programs
that are currently noncountervailable may become countervailable.
Those Mexican government programs potentially at risk might include
the bestowal of natural gas and fuel oil at prices below the world market
price.
F. Conclusion
Even though the United States has been a member of the GATT
since 1947, the GATT only recently required the United States to grant
an injury test in countervailing duty proceedings involving products from
Mexico. Dutiable and duty-free imports of Mexican origin became enti-
tled to an injury test in U.S. countervailing duty proceedings for the first
time in 1985, when Mexico entered into the Understanding with the
United States.
Duty-free imports of Mexican origin also became legally entitled to
an injury investigation pursuant to a second grant of authority in 1986,
when Mexico acceded to the GATT. Even though a "gap" in U.S. law
has prevented the United States from conducting a traditional injury in-
vestigation pursuant to Title VII of the Tariff Act for such imports, the
United States has been able to comply with its international obligations
vis-a-vis Mexico by resorting to another statutory provision of the Tariff
Act. To date, the U.S. Government has withstood all legal challenges
concerning its interpretation of the obligations that it assumed vis-a-vis
Mexico concerning the injury test requirement.
In addition to requiring the United States to grant an injury test in
U.S. countervailing duty proceedings, the Understanding obligated Mex-
ico to eliminate certain export subsidy programs and to refrain from be-
stowing certain domestic subsidies. Although both countries appear to
be generally satisfied with the implementation of the Understanding, two
recent judicial decisions addressing the countervailability of domestic
subsidies demonstrate that the relevant statutory test is currently in a
state of flux. This state of flux might ultimately have serious implications
for Mexico's natural gas program.
The countervailability of certain Mexican domestic programs is just
one of the many subsidization issues that should spark interest during the
forthcoming U.S.-Mexico free trade talks. Although the issues that will
dominate such talks should be qualitatively different from those that
characterized the U.S.-Canada free trade negotiations, U.S. and Mexican
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free trade negotiators would be wise to examine the countervailing duty
provisions of the U.S.-Canada FTA. Even though the U.S.-Canada FTA
may not serve as a carbon copy model for a prospective U.S.-Mexico free
trade accord, the U.S.-Canada experience should provide U.S. and Mexi-
can free trade negotiators with a valuable reference point as they begin
their challenging negotiations.
IV. THE UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Introduction
Article XXIV of the GATT - an exception to the fundamental
GATT principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment 93 -
authorizes GATT contracting parties to enter into free trade agreements
or customs unions."9 To receive GATT approval, such an agreement
must establish a plan or schedule to eliminate "duties and other restric-
tive. regulations of commerce"495 on "substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories in products originating in such territories." '496
In 1988, the United States and Canada entered into a free trade agree-
ment pursuant to Article XXIV of the GAIT. 4 9 7
The U.S.-Canada FTA, which took effect on January 1, 1989,498 is
unique among trade agreements negotiated pursuant to the GATT. In
particular, the Agreement covers trade in services and direct foreign in-
vestment.499 Additionally, the U.S.-Canada FTA establishes quasi-judi-
cial fora, similar to arbitration panels, to resolve bilateral trade
disputes."°° Chapter XIX of the Agreement covers antidumping and
countervailing duty matters.5"'
Because Chapter XIX may serve as a reference point for an analo-
gous chapter appearing in a prospective U.S.-Mexico FTA, this section
of the Article highlights the most important provisions of Chapter XIX
of the U.S.-Canada bilateral accord. Specifically, this section examines
493 GATT, art. I. This principle of nondiscrimination provides that a GATT contracting import-
ing country shall accord to a contracting exporting country treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to all other GATT contracting parties. Id.
494 GAIT, art XXIV.
495 Id. at para. 8(b).
496 Id.
497 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Communication from the President of the
United States, H. Doe. 100-268, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (III) (1988) (hereinafter "U.S.-Canada
Communication").
498 "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Implementation On Target," Business America 3 (Feb.
12, 1990).
499 FTA, arts. 1401, 1601.
500 FTA, arts. 1801, 1904.
501 FTA, arts. 1901 et seq.
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the creation of a binational panel review process designed to hear appeals
of final U.S. or Canadian antidumping or countervailing duty determina-
tions. This section also discusses the establishment of a U.S.-Canada
Working Group which has as its central purpose the task of "seek[ing] to
develop a substitute system of rules for dealing with unfair pricing and
government subsidization." 50 2
B. Binational Panel Review of Final Antidumping And
Countervailing Duty Determinations
The centerpiece of Chapter XIX of the U.S.-Canada FTA is the cre-
ation of a unique binational panel review process. This review process is,
in effect, a substitute for judicial review by the national courts of the
United States and Canada.50 3 It is also very similar in concept to inter-
national arbitration. U.S. or Canadian private parties, however, have the
option of foregoing binational panel review altogether and, instead, can
pursue legal redress in their national courts. 4
A decision rendered by a U.S.-Canada binational panel is binding
upon the governments of both countries and upon the private parties that
originally requested binational panel review.5"5 Such a decision, how-
ever, cannot serve as a binding precedent in future binational panel re-
views or in legal actions prosecuted in U.S. or Canadian courts."
Moreover, a binational panel decision cannot be appealed to the national
courts of either country.50 7
In accordance with Article 1904 of the Agreement, independent
binational panels consisting of U.S. and Canadian trade experts review
final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations rendered by
the relevant U.S. or Canadian administrative agencies.50 The purview of
the panel's inquiry is limited to whether the relevant administrative
agency applied its national antidumping or countervailing duty law cor-
rectly during the underlying administrative proceeding. °9 National
502 FrA, art. 1907, pam. l(b).
503 U.S.-Canada Communication at 258.
504 Id.
505 Id.; FTA, art. 1904, para. 9.
506 FrA, art. 1904, para. 9 and 10.
507 FTA, art. 1904, para. 11.
508 U.S.-Canada Communication at 258-259. Because the binational panel performs quasi-judi-
cial functions, the majority of panelists, including the chairman, must be U.S. and Canadian attor-
neys in good standing. FTA, Annex 1901.2(2). Nonattorneys, such as economists and political
scientists, however, may participate as panelists. Id. Each country can select two panelists from a
roster of pre-selected candidates. Id. The two countries typically select a fifth panelist through
mutual agreement. Id. at para. 3.
509 FTA, art. 1904, para. 2.
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law for purposes of binational panel review includes statutes, legislative
history, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative
determinations.5 10
A binational panel established pursuant to Chapter XIX must apply
the same standard of review and the same general legal principles that
the relevant national court would apply if the legal dispute were before
that tribunal.5 11 For example, a binational panel reviewing an adminis-
trative determination rendered by Commerce or the ITC would have to
apply the same standard of review that the CIT would have to apply in
legal actions commenced pursuant to section 516A of the Tariff Act.5 12
This standard is not one of de novo review,5 13 but rather is based upon
whether the contested administrative determination was supported by
substantial evidence on the administrative record as a whole and was
otherwise in accordance with law.
5 14
If the binational panel finds that the relevant administrative agency
applied its national antidumping or countervailing duty law correctly,
then the panel will affirm the underlying administrative determination. 515
If, however, the panel finds that the administrative agency erred in its
application of its national law, then, as do U.S. and Canadian courts, the
panel will remand the matter to the administrative agency for action not
inconsistent with the panel's decision.
5 16
A decision rendered by a binational panel conclusively settles the
legal dispute at issue under typical circumstances. 5 17 Accordingly, a pri-
vate party dissatisfied with a binational panel decision generally cannot
appeal that decision to a higher forum.5 18 The exception to this general
rule applies when a party alleges that (1) a panel member was guilty of
gross misconduct, (2) the panel "seriously departed from a fundamental
rule of procedure," 519 or (3) the panel "manifestly exceeded its powers,
authority, or jurisdiction" 52 0 and that such action has "materially af-
fected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational
510 Id.
511 FTA, art. 1904, para. 3.
512 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a et seq. (1990).
513 Ceramica Regiomontana, SA. v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 961, 965 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986),
aff'd, 810 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
514 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1990).
515 FTA, art. 1904, para. 8.
516 Id.
517 FTA, art. 1904, para. 9.
518 See id.
519 FTA, art. 1904, para. 13.
520 Id.
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panel review process."52' The Canadian or U.S. Government can avail
itself of a three-member extraordinary challenge committee under such
circumstances.
522
To date, binational panels convened pursuant to Chapter XIX of the
U.S.-Canada FTA have rendered eight decisions.5 23 None of these deci-
sions has been subject to the extraordinary challenge procedure described
above. 24 In Red Raspberres From Canada, for example, the first case
filed before a U.S.-Canada binational panel, the panel affirmed Com-
merce's determination to exclude the home-market sales of one of the
Canadian exporters for purposes of calculating foreign market value in
an antidumping duty administrative review.525 The panel, however, re-
manded Commerce's determinations concerning the two remaining Ca-
nadian exporters. 52
6
C. Creation Of U.S.-Canada Working Group
Article 1906 and Article 1907 contemplate the replacement of
Chapter XIX of the U.S.-Canada FTA with a new system of rules to
govern subsidization and dumping practices.5 27 Specifically, Article 1907
of the Agreement provides for the establishment of a U.S.-Canada Work-
ing Group which has as its chief purpose the task of developing such a
new regime.1
2 8
Pursuant to Article 1906, the Working Group must develop this
new system within five years of the effective date of the FrA. 29 If such a
system is not in place by the end of this five-year period, the parties may
extend the provisions of Chapter XIX for an additional period of two
521 Id.
522 Id.; FTA, Annex 1904.13.
523 Red Raspberries From Canada, USA-89-1904-01 (1989); Replacement Parts For Self-Propelled
Bituminous Paving Equipment From Canada, USA-89-1904-02 (1990Xchallenge to Commerce scope
determination); Replacement Parts For Self Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment From Canada,
USA-89-1904-03 (199OXchallenge to Commerce administrative review); Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Pork From Canada, USA-89-1904-06 (199OXCommerce countervailing duty determination); New
SteelRail, Except Light Rail, From Canada, USA-89-1904-07 (1990)(Commerce countervailing duty
determination); New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, From Canada, USA-89-1904-98 (1990)(Com-
merce antidumping duty determination); New Steel Rails From Canada, USA-89-1904-09/10
(1990)(ITC injury determination); Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork From Canada, USA-89-1904-11
(1990)(ITC injury determination).
524 See id.
525 USA-89-1904-01.
526 Id.
527 FrA, arts. 1906 and 1907.
528 FTA, art. 1907.
529 FrA, art. 1906.
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years. 530 If, by the end of this two-year extension, the parties still have
not implemented a new regime, then Article 1906 authorizes either party
to terminate the FTA.531
Establishing a new regime to govern subsidy and dumping practices
should prove to be a difficult task for the Working Group. This task
should be especially difficult with respect to subsidization practices.
Neither the United States nor Canada currently has an alternative body
of laws that governs such unfair trade practices. As a result, the whole-
sale replacement of the current countervailing duty system probably
would require the enactment of a new set of laws and the implementation
of an untested regime. The complete repeal of the current countervailing
duty system, therefore, seems highly unlikely, particularly in the immedi-
ate future.
Likewise, the task confronting the U.S.-Canada Working Group
with regard to dumping practices should prove to be no less difficult.
One suggestion that has generated some appeal among economists is to
replace the national antidumping laws of the United States and Canada
with anticompetitive laws - that is, the antitrust laws.532 If the U.S.-
Canada FTA achieves its objective of eliminating tariff and nontariff
trade barriers in the United States and Canada, then, according to the
classical theory of dumping, U.S. and Canadian exporters may have a
disincentive to dump their merchandise in each other's markets. 533 As a
result, the national antidumping laws of both countries might become
obsolete under such circumstances.
As explained in the first section of this Article, the classical theory
of dumping provides that tariffs and nontariff trade barriers in the foreign
exporter's home market create a protective barrier that usually enables
an exporter with market power in that market to earn excessive or mo-
nopolistic profits in the home market.534 The foreign exporter then can
use such profits to charge a relatively lower price for comparable mer-
chandise sold in an export market, such as the U.S. market.535 This the-
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 See also Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5
LAW AND POL'Y. INT'L. Bus. 86-87 (1973); Powell, Antidumping Law and the United States-Can-
ada Free Trade Agreement: Possible Next Steps, UNrrED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREE-
MENT: THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, 420-426 (1988)("Possible Next Steps").
533 J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 146 (1966 ed.); Address by
Calvin S. Goldman, Assistant Deputy Minister, Bureau of Competition Policy, Consumer, and Cor-
porate Affairs, before Canada/United States Law Institute of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, 6 (1987).
534 See id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
535 See id.
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ory further provides that the complete elimination of such barriers in the
home market prevents the foreign exporter from segmenting its home
market from a particular export market and, thereby, eliminates one of
the economic conditions necessary for dumping to occur.536
An example illustrates this point. Assume that a Canadian exporter
is charging the equivalent of U.S. $ 10.00 for its merchandise in the Ca-
nadian home market and U.S. $ 6.00 in the U.S. market. Absent trade
barriers in the two markets, a U.S. buyer may be able to purchase the
dumped Canadian merchandise in the U.S. market and resell that mer-
chandise in the Canadian home market at a price that is less than U.S. $
10.00. So long as the transportation costs incurred by the U.S. buyer/
reseller are lower than U.S. $ 4.00, the Canadian exporter's dumping
margin, the U.S. buyer/reseller can undersell the Canadian exporter in
the Canadian home market. In this manner, the U.S. buyer/reseller can
arbitrage away any price differential that exists in the two markets and
discourage the Canadian exporter from dumping its merchandise into the
U.S. market.537
Whether this economic theory of dumping has any validity is a de-
batable proposition. First, sufficient empirical evidence is not currently
available to test the validity of this economic theory. Second, even as-
suming its validity for long-term dumping, this theory would not apply
to short-term dumping or dumping from third countries. The elimina-
tion of trade barriers in both countries would not dissuade new entrants
or exporters from other foreign countries with heavily protected home
markets from dumping their merchandise into either Canada or the
United States. Moreover, a significant amount of time would have to
elapse before the arbitrage process could equalize selling prices in both
the United States and Canada. 38
If, despite these theoretical considerations, the U.S.-Canada Work-
ing Group were to recommend that the parties replace their national an-
tidumping statutes with antitrust laws, the antitrust laws would have to
provide, at a minimum, effective and speedy relief for short-term dump-
ing and dumping from third countries. Both Canada and the United
States already have promulgated antitrust laws that provide legal reme-
dies for anticompetitive pricing practices that arguably encompass dump-
ing practices or price discrimination.
In Canada, section 34(1)(c) of the Competition Act is the principal
536 See id.
537 See id.
538 See id.
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antitrust statute.5 39 In the United States, the Sherman Act' and the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,541 are the princi-
pal antitrust statutes. Although these anticompetitive laws in theory can
address price discrimination or dumping practices,54 2 none of these laws,
as currently drafted, could serve as an effective substitute for the national
antidumping laws of the United States or Canada.
Because of the variety of legal defenses available under these anti-
trust statutes, together with their rigorous legal standards, the antitrust
laws of both countries would provide relief for only the most egregious
types of dumping practices.543 Furthermore, because antitrust proceed-
ings in both countries are significantly more protracted than antidump-
ing proceedings, a domestic industry might be defunct by the time it
secured relief pursuant to the antitrust laws. Finally, foreign countries
may not be receptive to the extra-territorial reach of discovery require-
ments that accompany antitrust proceedings.
If, in spite of these practical considerations, the Working Group still
were to recommend replacing the national antidumping laws of both
countries with national antitrust laws, then both countries would have to
modify their current antitrust statutes. In the end, the Working Group
may discover that the superior approach with regard to developing a sub-
stitute system of rules to govern both dumping and subsidy practices is to
refine the current regime, rather than recommend the wholesale aban-
donment of that regime.
D. Implications For Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Talks
It is not certain at this moment what role, if any, Chapter XIX of
the U.S.-Canada FTA will play in shaping a future U.S.-Mexico FTA. If
the U.S. and Mexican free trade negotiators do decide to rely upon the
provisions of that chapter as a reference point during forthcoming free
trade talks, then they may be interested in the current progress of the
U.S.-Canada Working Group. The Working Group's findings may be-
come particularly relevant if, during the U.S.-Mexico talks, circum-
stances require the free trade negotiators to grapple with the issue of
modifying the existing U.S. and Mexican antidumping and counter-
vailing duty regime.
539 Powell, Possible Next Steps, at 423.
540 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
541 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
542 See supra notes 540, 541.
543 See id.; Powell, Possible Next Steps, at 422-426.
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V. CONCLUSION
On April 23, 1985, William E. Brock III, then United States Trade
Representative, and Hector Hernandez Cervantes, then Mexico's Secre-
tary of Commerce and Industrial Development, signed the U.S.-Mexico
Understanding. "This agreement,"'  said United States Trade Repre-
sentative Brock, "is an important first step forward in our bilateral trade
relations and should guarantee that trade flows more smoothly across
our common border." ' Secretary Hernandez added: "After fruitful
negotiations between officials of both countries, we have achieved more
stable market opportunities for Mexican exports, based on fair trade
principles." 5
United States Trade Representative Brock and Secretary Hernandez
also announced on that date that the United States and Mexico would
take a second step forward in bilateral trade relations by commencing
negotiations to conclude a general trade and investment agreement. In
1987, the United States and Mexico consummated this second step by
entering into the "Framework Agreement." The chief contribution of
this agreement was the establishment of a consultative mechanism
designed to resolve bilateral trade disputes.
By 1990, U.S.-Mexico bilateral trade relations have come full circle.
The United States and Mexico are ready to take the last step forward to
forge an historic economic partnership. Both countries are poised to
enter into complex and difficult negotiations to unite a relatively capital-
intensive economy with a relatively labor-intensive economy. The Gov-
ernment of Canada also has expressed a strong interest in participating in
these negotiations. It appears that the Canadians are seeking to unite the
economies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada to establish a so-
called "North American Trade Pact."
The "big" issues that should play a major role during forthcoming
U.S.-Mexico free trade negotiations include trade in services, labor flows,
immigration policies, direct foreign investment, and intellectual property
protection. Although these high profile issues have dominated the head-
lines during the past year in the American and Mexican trade press, U.S.
and Mexican negotiators should not overlook other less prominent, but
nonetheless critical, trade issues.
U.S. and Mexican free trade negotiators should place a particular
emphasis upon the current administration of the U.S. antidumping and
544 See supra note 1, at 1.
545 Id.
546 Id.
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countervailing duty laws. In that regard, U.S. and Mexican negotiators
would be wise to draw several important lessons from past experiences,
including that involving the interpretation of the U.S.-Mexico Under-
standing. Free trade negotiators should ensure that they fully under-
stand all the crucial terms of a prospective U.S.-Mexico FTA before
leaving the bargaining table. Otherwise, U.S. or Mexican exporters may
find themselves involved in needless, costly, and time consuming legal
battles.
As the United States and Mexico attempt to unite, either with or
without Canada, two radically different economies, the free trade negoti-
ators should avoid making the mistake of neglecting the less prominent,
but nonetheless critical, dumping and subsidization issues. Indeed, just
as similar issues - agricultural export subsidies, in particular - may
determine the ultimate fate of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negoti-
ations, so certain dumping and subsidization issues may determine the
ultimate success or failure of prospective U.S.-Mexico free trade talks.
If the U.S-Canada experience can serve as a model for future U.S.-
Mexico economic relations, then the manner in which these critical is-
sues are resolved during the forthcoming free trade talks may set the tone
for U.S.-Mexico relations well into the 21st Century. The challenge for
U.S. and Mexican free trade negotiators will be to resolve certain dump-
ing and subsidization issues in a manner that benefits both countries;
otherwise, a potential U.S.-Mexico free trade accord may not survive the
20th Century.
